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KNIGHT’S GAMBIT TO FOOL’S MATE:  
BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 
Eric Engle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In chess, a gambit is to offer a piece to draw an opponent into a 
worse position.  Knights are often gambited early in the game because 
they can enter play quickly and are of low value later in the game.  This 
Article discusses a different type of gambit:  the gambit made by 
progressives in taking up the idea of moral relativism in the hope to 
thereby critique the failed conservative morality.  But that gambit draws 
the Left into a fool’s mate, a rapid and unexpected reversal of fortunes.  
By taking the gambit, the Left becomes trapped and immobilized by the 
erroneous belief that normative inferencing is impossible.  That 
erroneous belief paralyzes any moral critique and transforms all 
arguments into economic ones. 
Political discourse of the last thirty years in America has been 
effectively monopolized by the political Right.  The American Left has, 
across the board, failed in its efforts to develop a coherent program1 to 
use law as a tool for reform, whether radical or gradual.2  Why is that?3  
We can look at any issue, whether political and defined around interests 
groups (women,4 non-whites, homosexuals,5 and criminals),6 or 
                                                          
*  M.Sc., Computer Science, Universität Bremen (currently writing thesis); Dr. Jur. Univ. 
Bremen, LL.M. Eur. Univ. Bremen; D.E.A., Fiscalité et Finances Publiques, Université de 
Paris II; D.E.A., Théorie Générale du Droit, University of Paris X Nanterre; J.D., Saint Louis 
University School of Law; B.A., Queen’s University, Canada.  I thank Professor John 
Griesbach at St. Louis for putting me into the labyrinth of legal theory, presenting 
questions that led to more questions.  I also thank Professor Christophe Grzegorczyk of the 
Centre de Théorie du Droit, Paris Nanterre.  He too did not present answers.  Rather, he 
gave me a method—first, look at onotology, then epistemology, and finally axiology.  That 
was the thread of Ariadne which led me to the answers I propose here.  Finally, I want to 
thank the editors of the Valparaiso University Law Review for their intellectual discipline, 
moral courage, and hard work. 
1 Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 755 
n.46 (1991). 
2 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1083 (2001).  See generally Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern 
Newspeak and Constitutional “Meaning” for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997). 
3 One suggestion is that the failure is due to alternative proposals by the Left.  I 
disagree.  Alternatives were proposed, attempts were made at implementation, yet 
proposed projects were not in fact implemented or immediately rolled back.  See, e.g., 
Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 333, 335 (2003) (supposed lack of alternative propositions). 
4 An example is the failure of the federal Equal Rights Amendment.  William P. 
Gunnar, The Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health Care System: Is Universal 
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economic and of general interest (health insurance,7 pensions, 
unemployment insurance, and poverty relief).8  In each and every case, 
the Left agenda, whether redistributive9 or social, has been routed.  At 
the same time, the current United States government has squandered a 
budget surplus built by Democrats,10 along with the goodwill of the 
entire world11 and the American people,12 in a counterproductive war in 
                                                                                                                                  
Health Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 178 n.226 
(2006). 
5 See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 248 (2006). 
6 E.g., Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving 
Standards of Decency” and the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
441, 442 (2004) (reconstitutionalization of the death penalty). 
7 Bruce Spitz & John Abramson, When Health Policy Is the Problem: A Report from the Field, 
30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 338 (2005). 
8 Daniel B. Klaff, Evaluating Work: Enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Standards in 
the United States, Canada and Sweden, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 613, 617 (2005) (failure of 
President Johnson’s Great Society program). 
9 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and 
Accommodation, Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 835. 
10 Nancy-Ann DeParle, Medicare at 40: A Mid-Life Crisis?, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 70, 
96 (2004). 
When the Bush Administration took office in January 2001, the 
Congressional Budget Office projected a $5.6 trillion surplus over the 
next ten years.  Now the surplus is gone—thanks in no small part to a 
$1.7 trillion tax cut—and the government faces deficits as far as the 
CBO computers can calculate. 
Id.  George Anastaplo, Law, Judges, and the Principles of Regimes: Explorations, 70 TENN. L. 
REV. 455, 487 n.116 (2003) (“We have seen, since this 1992 talk, that remarkable switch in 
positions which has had a Democratic Administration presiding over a Budget surplus and 
a Republican Administration preparing to preside over an unprecedented Budget deficit.”). 
11  For a brief and powerful moment, most of the rest of the world 
genuinely shared our loss.  Most were prepared to support us in 
almost every conceivable way to win the war on terrorism.  Needlessly 
and senselessly, we have squandered that good will.  How?  In part, by 
employing bullying rhetoric (as President Bush did in his address to 
Congress on September 20, 2001, when he said, “either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists”), by reinforcing perceptions of 
American bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and by demanding the 
world fall in line, on our schedule and on the basis of shifting 
rationales, to depose Saddam Hussein. 
George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 21, 
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; 
Susan E. Rice, U.S. National Security Policy Post-9/11: Perils and Prospects, FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF., Winter 2004, at 133-34. 
12 “We have to renew the spirit of national purpose, unity, and resolve we showed after 
September 11th—and which George W. Bush has squandered since.”  In Their Own Words: 
The 2004 U.S. Presidential Candidates on Foreign Policy, Joseph I. Lieberman, FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF, Winter 2004, at 5, 21. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/7
2007] Beyond Legal Realism 1635 
Iraq.13  Yet we see no presidential impeachment, neither for 
incompetence nor for lying and sending Americans to perish in the 
desert in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.  The failure 
of the Left could not be more complete.   
This Article traces and explains the failure of the Left’s agenda in 
legal discourse.14  Particularly, this Article discusses the failure of the 
Left to implement its agenda.  Affirmative action?  Racial profiling.  
Women’s rights?  Feminazis.  Prison reform?  Three strikes.  Further, the 
Left’s comprehensive failure due to its adoption of a failed axiology is 
explained.   
Axiology is the theory of values—the theory of choice of determinant 
values.  The Left adopted moral relativism as early as the 1930s in the 
work of the legal realists.  But relativist axiology has taken the Left 
nowhere because it is inaccurate; the Left’s erroneous relativist axiology 
is the result of an erroneous epistemology.15  Thus, the correct 
epistemological foundations needed in order to obtain a correct theory of 
moral choice must first be exposed and clarified.  The failed relativist 
axiology results from a confused and incoherent relativist epistemology.  
The incoherent relativist epistemology is, in turn, the result of a confused 
ontology; ontology is the theory of being—the science of determining the 
basic nature of existence.  A correct and coherent epistemology is needed 
                                                          
13 “[W]hatever legal and political capital that the United States and its military campaign 
fuelled in the run up to ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ was effectively squandered away in 
the rash and ill-advised ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’”  Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, 
Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers—Legal Perspectives on America’s 
Counter-Terrorism Responses, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 243, 293 (2005).  “Indeed, instead of 
working for progress toward a rule of law, . . . the Bush Administration [is] lurching 
toward a rule of scofflaw.”  John W. Head, Responding to 9/11: Lurching Toward a Rule of 
Scofflaw, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Fall 2005, at 4. 
14 Ackerman seems to blame the failure of the Left on psychological and mass 
psychological grounds.  Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1519, 1528 (1997) (new Left failed due to psychological grounds); Bruce Ackerman, 
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489-90 (1989) (new Left failed due 
to mass psychology).  If the Left just needed a good therapist, it would have been in power 
ages ago.  Others also think the failure of the Left is due to psychological factors: 
“Ironically, it turns out that the American intellectual left failed in large part because they 
somehow mistakenly assumed that everyone, at base, was like them.”  David M. Smolin, 
The Dilemmas and Methodologies of Academic Political Liberalism: An Analysis of Professor 
Lawrence Friedman’s Response to the Problem of Violent Crime, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 959, 972 (1996-
97).  But, in fact, most people are like each other.  Psychology does not explain the failure of 
the Left.  The Reagans and Bushes are every bit as dysfunctional as the Clintons.  Although 
this Article rejects the psychological failure thesis, the fact that intellectuals are so off base 
that they are looking at psychology, as if politics were a talk show or a sitcom, shows the 
shallowness of contemporary United States political discourse. 
15 Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. 
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to find a well-founded theory of moral choice, which is necessary for 
legal reforms.  To obtain a correct epistemology, a correct ontology is 
required.  Determine the correct ontology, and the epistemology 
basically falls into place.  Rectify the epistemology, and the axiology falls 
into place.  Rectify the axiology, and legal methodology and political 
agenda fall into place.  With a correct theory of moral values, the Left is 
more likely to implement its substantive policies. 
Thus, this Article addresses the goal—implementing certain ideas—
in reverse order.  First, the essential nature of the problem—its 
ontology—is diagnosed in Part II.  Certain basic propositions of the 
theory of knowledge (epistemology) are then determined, which must be 
understood in order to move to the next step.  From a correct 
epistemological perspective, this Article moves forward to a correct 
theory of choice of values (axiology) in Part III.  Then, with a basic 
understanding of a correct ontology, epistemology, and axiology, it is 
possible to properly situate American legal and political discourse, 
understand its potential and limits, and resituate that discourse and its 
legal methods as part of a coherent framework for fundamental change.  
This contextualization permits one to pose and answer fundamental 
questions of legal theory (methods of interpretation) and political 
practice (finalities of U.S. foreign policy), which is the topic of Part IV. 
More specifically, a materialist ontology leads to a monist 
epistemology, and thus an objective epistemology.  Materialism and 
monism preclude dualist noetic theories such as platonism and neo-
platonism.  Avoiding platonism also avoids confusion resulting from 
needless multiplication of intentional entities.  On the basis of the 
materialist epistemology, a correct cognitivist axiology can be attained 
and an incorrect relativist axiology will be avoided.  Cognitivism is 
simply the idea that moral values are knowable, that we can have 
knowledge of what is meant by “good” and “bad” acts.  Cognitivist 
axiology allows the Left to resituate arguments that have been pushed 
into the economic arena from the moral arena.  But the Left cannot 
advance its agenda of equal rights in economic terms.  Only by 
resituating the discourse of equality back into the field of morality can 
the Left hope to implement its views. 
The Left’s discourse has failed.16  This was due to errors in 
assumptions of the nature of reality.17  The Left’s goals may have been 
                                                          
16 See, e.g., Dennis H. Wrong, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe, 
17 CONTEMP. SOC. 381-83 (1988) (book review). 
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unrealistic, but even realistic goals can only be attained on the basis of 
correct understandings of the world as it is. In place of the failed 
relativism of the Left, this Article uses a monist, materialist, holist, and 
cognitivist method. This method is applied proceeding from 
fundamentally prior concepts to their theoretical consequences.  The 
epistemological basis of realist legal method is examined in Part II.  After 
understanding materialist epistemology, Part III examines the axiological 
consequences of the chosen theories.  In Part IV, a discourse on legal 
method flows logically from the mutually supporting theories of 
ontology (materialism), epistemology (monism), and axiology 
(cognitivism), which leads to a new theory of natural law with attendant 
legal methods.   
II.  THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF REALIST LEGAL METHOD 
Late modern legal thought often suffers from confusion stemming 
from two distinct but similar concepts:  epistemological relativism18 
                                                                                                                                  
17 See Richard Flacks, Reflections on Strategy in a Dark Time: Radical Democracy—A Relic of 
the 60s, or an Idea Whose Time has Come?, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996), available at 
http://bostonreview.net/BR20.6/flacks.html. 
We in the new left assumed that the corporate-liberal model was the 
only viable framework for sustaining modern capitalism.  We assumed 
that laissez-faire capitalism was a thing of the past, that economic 
growth could now be permanently engineered by the corporate state, 
and that a sense of  social responsibility was prevalent among 
corporate managers.  And so, we tended to believe, the  welfare state 
did not need defence from the left—our job was to present its 
conservative functions in dampening social unrest, expanding 
consumer markets, and undermining class consciousness.  The benefits 
of corporate liberalism for the wider population were assumed by new 
leftists to be well-established.  Our goal was to undertake its critique 
and try to create alternatives.  Over the past 25 years, however, this 
radical-democratic impulse of the New left has been lost.  The 
explanation of that loss begins in the early 1970s, when the fiscal crisis 
of the state turned corporate elite consensus against The Model. With 
corporate profits shrinking under the pressure of global economic 
competition, elite consensus shifted toward the need to free capital for 
global opportunities. That meant a lowering of living standards and 
expectations for American workers, as well as a reduction in state 
efforts to channel investment for domestic purposes. It was the 
corporate-liberal state—not laissez-faire—that was obsolete. 
Id. 
18 “[T]he whole texture of twentieth century philosophical thought, which has produced 
an epistemological relativism often said (with some justice) to underlie contemporary 
liberalism.”  Kevin F. Ryan, Lex et Ratio, VT. B.J., Apr. 2003, at 5, 12. 
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(nihilism19 or skepticism) and axiological relativism20 
(intersubjectivity).21  If a legal theorist employs either or both of these 
related lines of thought carelessly, the result is the usual post-modern 
confusion.22  This prudent council, to be careful to make one’s 
presumptions known, would be met with approval by David Hume.23   
                                                          
19 For a sense of the depth of the split in U.S. legal discourse, see, e.g., Harry V. Jaffa, 
Graglia’s Quarrel with God: Atheism and Nihilism Masquerading as Constitutional Argument, 4 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 716 (1995) (commingling nihilism and relativism). 
20 Axiology is merely the theory of choice of values.  Some authors appear to confound 
axiology and relativism.  “Schmitt proposes a conceptual and historical analogy between 
axiology (the theory of values as ethical relativism) and total war.”  Jorge E. Dotti, Schmitt 
Reads Marx, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1473, 1483-84 (2000).  An objectivist axiology is also 
possible. 
21 See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36 
U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 677 (2002). 
22 See Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring For Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85, 95-96 
(2000). 
[A]ll its connections as well as all other attributes it may be thought to 
possess, are accidental, contingent, or random, and furthermore, they 
are so essentially.  This is not an empirical, descriptive, tentative claim 
about our modern nature, it is a transcendental claim about the nature 
of nature. . . .  [T]he postmodern self so dear to the heart of 
postmodern theorists is . . . as changing, unstable, and unpredictable as 
the wind. . . .  To repeat, that inessential self is . . . not a hypothetical 
description, subject to modification or amendment as new evidence 
presents itself. It is a metaphysically transcendent truth.  It is very 
difficult to see what sort of idea West is describing here.  At times West 
seems to regard this postmodern self, like the liberal self, as a 
description of an empirical entity—a claim about “the nature of 
nature,” albeit one that the postmodernists dogmatically refuse to 
allow to be contested or corrected by contrary evidence.  Confusingly, 
West depicts the postmodern self as “unstable, and unpredictable as 
the wind,” implying that, like the weather, the postmodern self has a 
real existence in the world, if one that is sometimes hard to keep track 
of.  West’s declaration that the postmodern self is essentially 
inessential is the sort of glib verbal manipulation feminists have 
always had to endure in arguments with the patriarchy.   
Id. (quoting ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997)).  The problem is not with West or 
with Feminism.  The problem is with postmodernism.  West is correct.  The postmodern 
sense of self—and anything else for that matter—is mutable because it is founded not on 
objective empirical facts but subjective internal feelings.  Postmodernism is one step short 
of solipsism.  West is just one example. 
23 But see Francesco Parisi, Alterum Non Laedere: An Intellectual History of Civil Liability, 39 
AM. J. JURIS. 317, 338 (1994). 
David Hume challenged the scholastic notion of prudence, 
underscoring the practical insufficiency of such a moral ideal in a 
society of self-centered beings.  In the Aristotelian ideal of prudence, 
the goal of self-perfection of human character was paramount.  
According to Hobbes, however, the self in need of perfection was 
foreign to real political and legal concerns.  In his view, of the four 
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Moral relativism24 and post-modernism25 have been responsible for 
confusion in legal thinking26 because of misinterpretations of Hume27 
and Nietzsche.28  By addressing the philosophical roots of legal 
methodology this Article seeks to clarify some of that confusion to 
correct the methodology that flows from it, so that law can work justice.   
Hume observes that those who make prescriptive arguments—
arguments about what one ought to do—generally make the following 
mistake:29  the proponent of the argument will begin with a series of 
descriptive statements—factual descriptions of reality as it is30—but the 
argument’s proponent will reach a prescriptive conclusion—that one 
                                                                                                                                  
cardinal virtues, only justice could maintain full dignity in a truly 
positivist conception of law.  While prudence and the other cardinal 
virtues of courage and temperance remained desirable attributes of the 
human character, they no longer could imply the existence of related 
civil or legal obligations. 
Id. 
24 “[T]he emergence of moral relativism in Western thought, in which it is believed that 
there are no objective truths and that morals are relative and subjective, has led 
contemporary legal theories to reject natural law and other normative concepts.”  Erin 
Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the Contemporary Legal Concept of Environmental Injury: An 
Appeal to Enhance “One-Eyed Reason” with a Normative Consciousness, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38 
(2004). 
25 “Hume deconstructed the self, and argued that the self was simply a bundle of 
perceptions. The postmodernist conception can jokingly but pretty accurately be 
characterized as ‘Hume plus advertising.’”  Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist 
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1991). 
26 E.g., Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling with a Grotian Moment: Sovereignty and the Quest 
for a Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829, 850 n.61 (1993).  “The confusion of 
targets identified in postmodernist theories also bedevils C[ritical] L[egal] S[tudies].”  Id. 
27 E.g., Steven Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1916, 
1921-22 (2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999)).  “Hume’s Law is sometimes stated as: An ought cannot be derived from an is.  The 
proper conception of Hume’s Law, however, is that an ought statement cannot be derived 
merely from an is statement.”  Id.  This Article goes further and suggests that Hume was not 
saying anything more than one must make his ought statements known and not confuse 
them with his is statements. 
28 Most frequently, people think that Nietzsche is saying that there is no morality, when 
in fact Nietzsche was struggling to build a new morality. 
29 See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. 
Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739-40) [hereinafter HUME, A TREATISE OF 
HUMAN NATURE].  “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning . . . .”  Id. 
30 “[T]he author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs . . . .”  Id. 
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ought to do a certain thing.31  Hume’s critique is that the proponent of 
the prescriptive argument has shifted from descriptive statements of 
what “is” (“is” statements) to a prescriptive statement of what “ought” 
to be done (“ought” statements).32  Hume implores proponents of 
prescriptive arguments to explain how they make this transition from 
descriptive “is” statements to prescriptive “ought” statements.33  That is 
all Hume says on the subject—nothing more, nothing less.  If one is to 
mix statements of what is and what ought, one must make explicit the 
prescriptive or descriptive nature of those statements and how one shifts 
from description to prescription—for example, the major premise that 
“one ought to be kind” and the minor premise that “torturing people is 
not kind” with the conclusion that “thus, one ought not torture people.”  
This is a perfectly valid syllogism of practical reasoning (phronesis) in 
the form of modus ponens, and it is unambiguous because the “is” and 
“ought” statements are explicit.  One may attack either the major or 
minor premise with no risk of confusion of an “is” statement with an 
“ought” statement.  If both the major and minor premises were “is” 
statements with an “ought” conclusion, that might be per se invalid.  
However, Hume does not get that explicit in his critique of 
enthymematic “ought” statements.  Even if “is” and “ought” statements 
had to be distributed such that there was a prescriptive statement both in 
the premise and in the conclusion, which is what Hume was really 
referring to, that might not be invalid if one can recast “ought” 
statements as a particular kind of “is” statement.  However, Hume leaves 
a lot unsaid. 
But here is why:  Hume’s argument, though clear on its own terms 
is, in fact, very modest.  Hume is merely exhorting philosophers to make 
their “is” and “ought” statements explicit and to show how they make 
                                                          
31 “[W]hen of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, 
or an ought not.”  Id. 
32  This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.  
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or 
affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and 
at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems 
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it. 
Id. 
33  But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to 
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small 
attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us 
see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the 
relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason. 
Id. 
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the transition from an “is” statement to an “ought” conclusion.  But he 
might believe they cannot and, in all events, puts the burden of proof on 
he who would infer norms.  That move is far more effective than trying 
to determine when and whether normative inferencing is possible.  
However, Hume’s modest proposal has been extended well beyond 
its own terms.34  Hume has been interpreted to argue that normative 
inferencing—deriving “ought” statements—is somehow impossible.35  
However, Hume does not make that argument.36  Those who take the 
                                                          
34 See Nicholas Capaldi, Hume’s Rejection of ‘Ought’ as a Moral Category, 63 J. PHIL. 126, 
135-36 (1966). 
Hume’s statements about moral sentiments are confused with his 
statements about moral judgments.  It is this confusion which largely 
accounts for the misinterpretation of (I-O).  That (I-O) is not concerned 
with moral judgments but with moral sentiments is best seen in two 
ways.  First, the entire section deals with a single problem: the attempt 
to show that moral distinctions or sentiments are perceived not as 
relations of ideas but as impressions. Second, the conclusions of (I-O) 
all deal with the analysis of moral distinctions as impressions.  Since (I-
O) concerns moral sentiments and not moral judgments, we may 
inquire into the cause of the confusion. At least one reason is that the 
paragraph is occasionally read or quoted in an incomplete 
manner. . . .  Once we accept the view that moral distinctions are 
impressions, we must also accept the fact that we can make inferences 
about such distinctions and even infer their existence from 
accompanying circumstances. 
Id. 
35 See W. D. Falk, Hume on Is and Ought, in OUGHT, REASONS, AND MORALITY 551 (W.D. 
Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969).  Hume supposedly 
denies the deductibility of the latter from the former, as the ‘ought’ 
expresses ‘a new relation or affirmation’, ‘entirely different from the 
others’.  And this is commonly taken as saying that the ought 
statement is ‘different’ and non-deducible, because it is no longer a 
‘purely factual statement’, to wit one that makes another ordinarily 
testable truth claim.  However, recent criticism, by W.D. Hudson and 
others, points out that Hume says other things seemingly inconsistent 
with this. . . .  How is one to understand Hume here so as to save him 
from incoherence? It is said by Flew that Hume really meant that 
moral statements, rather than being about attitudes, serve to express 
them.  The real Hume was the ancestor of noncognitivism, and the ‘is-
ought’ passage its early charter.  By contrast, it is said by MacIntyre 
that really Hume did not mean to deny deducibility.  When he said 
that it ‘seemed inconceivable’, he meant that it only seemed so without 
really being so. 
Id. 
36 See A.C. MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’ in THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION 485, 493 
(W.D. Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969).  “Hume in the celebrated passage does not mention 
entailment. What he does is to ask how and if moral rules may be inferred from factual 
statements, and in the rest of Book II of the Treatise he provides an answer to his own 
questions.”  Id. 
Engle: Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate:  Beyond Legal Realism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1642 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
overly broad interpretation of Hume improperly argue that Hume shows 
that normative inferencing is impossible, and if that is so, it is also 
impossible to make any “ought” statements at all.37  But this is not 
Hume’s point.38  If normative inferencing were impossible, then 
prescriptive argumentation would also be impossible.  And, if 
prescriptive argumentation were impossible, then everyone would be 
relativists, regardless of their subjective opinions about their (supposed) 
objectivity.  However, the logical conclusion is based on a faulty premise.  
Hume does not argue, let alone prove, anything about normative 
inferencing.  But this misinterpretation of Hume as arguing for an 
impossibility of normative inferencing is one of the bases of 
contemporary moral relativism.39  Moral relativism as an ideology is a 
failure, and its failure helps explain the subsequent failure of the left. 40  
Exposing misinterpretations of Hume sets the stage for a correct 
reposition of political discourse regarding inalienable human rights back 
into the arena of morality and out of the field of alienable economic 
goods.  By showing that normative inferencing is possible (distributed 
prescriptive major premise and conclusion), it becomes possible again to 
argue that (1) one ought to oppose killing; (2) the war in Iraq kills; and 
(3) thus one ought to oppose the war in Iraq.  If one asks why one ought 
to do anything, the quick answer is “survival of the species.”  That is 
materialism—grounding statements not in ideals floating in the air, but 
in the facts of the world as it is.  
                                                          
37 See W.D. Hudson, Hume on Is and Ought, in THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION 511 (W.D. 
Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969).  “Here, as elsewhere in Hume, adumbrations of modern 
theory are distorted by his failure to differentiate clearly and explicitly logical from 
psychological or sociological issues.”  Id. 
38 See Falk, supra note 35, at 562.  “Hume’s point . . . is not to deny that merit is 
cognitively derived from fact; but to make sure that theis derivation is not mistaken for 
deduction.”  Id. 
39 See, e.g., Ethics, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006), http://www.iep. 
utm.edu/e/ethics.htm. 
David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our emotions, 
and not our reason.  We can amass all the reasons we want, but that 
alone will not constitute a moral assessment.  We need a distinctly 
emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement.  Reason 
might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume’s 
words, “reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.”  Inspired 
by Hume’s anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, 
most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments are 
factual descriptions. 
Id. 
40 See, e.g., Eric Barnes, Supplemental Notes on Relativism, (Sept. 29, 1999), available at 
http://138.110.28.9/courses/ebarnes/205/205-sup-relativism.htm. 
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Nietzsche is the other principal basis of moral relativism.  And, like 
Hume, he is misinterpreted often and those misinterpretations paralyze 
critical discourse.  Nietzsche argues that morality is subjective in that it is 
the product of individuals’ choices.41  He rejects Christian morality and 
repositions morality by putting it on an individualist and authoritarian 
basis.42  Rather than the Christian morality of martyrdom and self-
sacrifice, Nietzsche proposes an individualistic morality of egoistic self 
aggrandizement.43  Nietzsche is not amoral.  Rather, he clearly has a 
prescriptive agenda, though his morality is not Christian. 
Like Hume, Nietzsche is also often taken too far:  Nietzsche might be 
some kind of a moral relativist, but his epistemology is not relativist.  By 
pointing out Nietzsche’s objective epistemology and correctly 
understanding his axiology not as nihilism but as egoism, the abuse of 
Nietzsche to advance the relativism which sapped the strength of the 
Left can be rejected.  If epistemology is objective, which is Nietzsche’s 
view, then an objective axiology is possible.  
By focusing on the bases of moral relativism, this Article will show 
how an objective morality is possible and that, by shifting from a failed 
relativist world view toward a materialist morality, the Left can regain 
those moral cognitivists it has lost to the Right.  Likewise, an objective 
materialist view of axiology would allow the Left to make prescriptions, 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Friedrich Nietzche, Götzendämmerung, “Die Verbesserer der Menschheit,” 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/goetzend/goetze08.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
Man kennt meine Forderung an den Philosophen, sich jenseits von Gut 
und Böse zu stellen,—die Illusion des moralischen Urtheils unter sich 
zu haben.  Diese Forderung folgt aus einer Einsicht, die von mir zum 
ersten Male formulirt worden ist: dass es gar keine moralischen 
Thatsachen giebt.  Das moralische Urtheil hat Das mit dem religiösen 
gemein, dass es an Realitäten glaubt, die keine sind.  Moral ist nur eine 
Ausdeutung gewisser Phänomene, bestimmter geredet, eine 
Missdeutung. Das moralische Urtheil gehört, wie das religiöse, einer 
Stufe der Unwissenheit zu, auf der selbst der Begriff des Realen, die 
Unterscheidung des Realen und Imaginären noch fehlt: so dass 
“Wahrheit” auf solcher Stufe lauter Dinge bezeichnet, die wir heute 
“Einbildungen” nennen. Das moralische Urtheil ist insofern nie 
wörtlich zu nehmen: als solches enthält es immer nur Widersinn. Aber 
es bleibt als Semiotik unschätzbar: es offenbart, für den Wissenden 
wenigstens, die werthvollsten Realitäten von Culturen und 
Innerlichkeiten, die nicht genug wussten, um sich selbst zu “verstehn.”  
Moral ist bloss Zeichenrede, bloss Symptomatologie: man muss bereits 
wissen, worum es sich handelt, um von ihr Nutzen zu ziehen. 
Id. 
42 Friedrich Nietzche, Beyond Good and Evil, http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/ 
jenseits/jense002.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
43 Id. 
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and thus enable it to win arguments that it currently cannot win because 
of being trapped within the dead-end that is relativism.  
A. Dualism (Plato) 
Dualism44 (particularly Manichaeism)45 has marked and marred 
Western thought virtually since the beginning of recorded history.  The 
results of dualism are rather clear:  separation (self vs. other), alienation 
(employer vs. employee), depression, abuse (parent vs. child), and war 
(“my” country vs. “your” country).  Plato is perhaps the first recorded 
example of dualism in Western philosophy46 and should be contrasted 
from pre-Socratics, such as Pythagoras and Heraclites, who were 
monists.47  Unfortunately, though Plato’s epistemology is largely 
rejected, his ontological dualism is not.  Plato distinguishes ideas (eidos)48 
from the material (hulé),49 and believes that the idea is somehow prior to 
the material in the sense of somehow causing it.  For Plato, material 
objects are a reflection of ideas,50 and the world is nothing more than a 
reflection of the thoughts of God.  In modern terms, he is guilty of 
magical thinking, he makes a map of reality and then thinks the map is 
reality. 
Unfortunately for Plato, and fortunately for science, no one has taken 
his epistemology very seriously for at least a millennium.  One mark of 
modernity is the monopoly of empirical materialism on scientific debate.  
For modernity, our ideas are a reflection of the material world.  But the 
rejection of Plato did not have to await industrialization.  Even Aristotle 
                                                          
44 Dualism is the idea that there is a fundamental split between mind and matter. 
45 Manichaeism is the idea that the universe is dualistic and that the duality is marked 
by an absolute conflict between polar opposites. 
46 The view that there is a separation in the human person between the mind and the 
body dates from the history of Western thought to Platonic dualism.  Plato’s dualist theory 
holds that there are actually two different worlds: the physical world of appearances and 
the higher world of intelligible Forms.  For Plato, human beings live in a visible world of 
the sensible or physical and the invisible world of the intelligible or abstract.  This Platonic 
dualism was carried forward into a similar separation in the human person between mind 
and body.  Don G. Rushing & William D. Janicki, Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Claims Under the Warsaw Convention, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 429, 430 (2005). 
47 Ron Shapira, Structural Flaws of the “Willed Bodily Movement” Theory of Action, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 349, 385 n.121 (1998). 
48 Alicia Juarrero-Roque, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an Evolutionary 
Model of Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (1991). 
49 Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2267 (2001). 
50 Aloysius A. Leopold & Marie E. Kaiser, The Lord in the Law: Reflections on a Catholic 
Law School, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 385, 389 (1993). 
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was skeptical about Platonic formalism.51  Similarly, Descartes52 and 
Pascal,53 although themselves dualists,54 did not attempt to defend 
platonic idealism, despite the solipsistic55 skepticism of Descartes that 
could admit Plato’s purely noëtic world.56  In fact, Aquinas seems to be 
the most recent person to have taken platonic idealism seriously.57  
In law, platonism plays out as formalism:  to see the law in rigid 
terms of eternal and unchanging forms of action, which themselves are 
reflections of logical structure.  Plato was wrong:  reality is not the 
reflection of ideas; ideas are a reflection of reality.  However, attempts to 
oppose formalism with relativism have not only failed, they have 
backfired because, though Plato was wrong, Cicero was right—law is 
right reasoning in accord with nature58—and consequently Holmes was 
wrong59—the life of law is logic in action; it is phroenesis,60 the practical 
                                                          
51 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS bk. I, pt. 9 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1924) (350 
B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.mb.txt; see also 
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. B, pt. 3, l.10 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 1981); 
ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS bk. A, pt. 31 (Robin Smith trans., 1989). 
52 RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), available at 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/meditations.html. 
53 Pascal, for example, specifically declines any attempt to prove the existence of “God” 
that is a nöous.  “Therefore I shall not undertake here to prove by natural reasons either the 
existence of God, or the Trinity, or the immortality of the soul, or anything of that 
nature . . . .”  BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES § VIII (1660), available at http://www.textfiles.com/ 
etext/NONFICTION/pascal-pensees-569.txt. 
54 See generally id. 
55 Solipsism is the philosophical theory that the self is the only thing that can be known 
and verified.  See DESCARTES, supra note 52 (English); id., available at http://abu.cnam.fr/ 
cgi-bin/go?medit3 (French). 
56 See Philippe Nonet, In Praise of Callicles, 74 IOWA L. REV. 807, 808 (1989). 
The Republic restates the same thought in the form of the distinction 
between two realms: that of the noëton, accessible to reason, nous, and 
of which knowledge, noësis, is possible; and that of the horaton, visible 
to the eyes, and about which there can be only doxa, what seems, mere 
opinion. 
Id. 
57 See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province trans., 1947). 
58 “[E]st quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans, 
sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat . . . [H]uic legi nec 
obrogari fas est, neque derogari aliquid ex hac licet, neque tota abrogari potest . . . .”  
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA: SCRIPTA QUAE MANSERUNT OMNIA 96, bk. III, pt. 
22, § 33, ll. 26-32 (K. Ziegler ed., Leipzig 1969) (Bibliotheca Teubneriana fasc. 39). 
59 Holmes argues for a pre-scientific view of law: 
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more 
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reasoning that looks at the world as it is and attempts to shape the world 
as it ought to be.  Holmes did not realize that he was trying to describe 
phroenesis because his ideas were influenced by Hume61 rather than 
Aristotle, and Hume is interpreted as rejecting the possibility of practical 
reasoning because he (supposedly) does not see that moral prescriptions 
can be based on material analysis.62  
One can infer from all this that Platonic idealism is indefensible.  It 
has been quietly abandoned and replaced—first by materialism, then by 
skepticism, and now, perhaps, by relativism.  Both relativism63 and 
Platonic idealism64 are unscientific because they lack an empirical 
foundation, which is definitive of science.65  The material world is 
radically separated from and anterior to the world of ideas (Plato), or 
relativised (post-modernism),66 and so no scientific verification of their 
propositions is possible. 
                                                                                                                                  
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).  A simple reductio meets the 
argument.  If syllogisms are irrelevant why bother thinking?  Why not just break out the 
billy clubs?  If law is nothing but passion and prejudice, then law has no moral force and I 
might as well go be a criminal.  Of course, if one were a criminal one would have a bad life 
and society would be worse off.  Actions follow ideas.  Moreover, if we look at the law, we 
see it is more than physical force it is also moral constraint.  Holmes’ view is amoral, but 
the province of law is morality.  See Id. 
60 Scharffs, supra note 49, at 2265-66. 
61 Holmes and Hume alike embrace Western values but question their ultimate 
foundation.  Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the 
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 653 (2001). 
62 HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 29, at 416.  It is not “contrary to 
reason to prefer even my own acknowleg’d lesser good to my greater . . . .”  Id. 
63 Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1203 n.98 
(2001). 
64 “[S]ome form of mind-body dualism has been part of Western philosophy since 
Plato . . . .”  Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 411 (1995). 
65 J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 564 
(2004).  “Scientific Method . . . is defined by the use of empirical observation and 
experimental testing to formulate and evaluate hypotheses, usually about causal 
mechanisms, with which to predict . . . .”  Id. 
66 Some even try to combine relativism with dualism.  For example, Radbruch  
combines relativism with neo-Kantian methodological dualism: 
statements of what the law ought to be may be established only 
through other statements concerning the “ought,” never through what 
the law “is.”  “Ought” statements may not be “discerned but only 
professed.”  Therefore, legal science in the field of the “ought” can 
achieve three things: (1) “establish the means necessary to realize the 
end that ought to be attained,” (2) “think a legal value judgment 
through down to the remotest means for its realization, 
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B. Relativism  
The task of epistemology is to determine “what is knowledge.”67  
Post-modern thought often presents relativism as though it were 
something new, a radical reaction to the violence and cynicism of two 
world wars.  In fact, however, truth skepticism is nothing new.  Even 
among pre-modern philosophers—notably the cynics, but also the 
sophists generally—truth skepticism, even nihilism, could be found.  
More recently, the roots of (post-)modern relativism are generally 
ascribed, with some degree of justice and distortion, to Hume68 and 
Nietzsche.69  The post-modernists are riding the crest of a wave of 
skepticism, which has indeed grown due to the failure of the nation-state 
system to preserve peace in the last century.  However, post-modernism 
as a system of thought is neither particularly new nor correct. 
1. Nietzsche 
Nietzsche is probably the most well-known modern example of 
skepticism towards received truth.70  The idea of progress is a central 
                                                                                                                                  
[and] . . . clarify it up to its ultimate presuppositions of world outlook,” 
and (3) develop systematically the “conceivable ultimate 
presuppositions and, consequently, all starting points of legal 
evaluation.”  Radbruch presents a relativistic legal philosophy that 
exhaustively presents the individual with all possibilities from which 
only he or she can decide. 
Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 489, 509-10 (2000).  But where is the law in that?  Law is nothing other than ought 
statements. You ought not to steal (or you will go to jail).  In fact, any “ought” statement 
can be recast into a conditional (“if . . . then”) statement.  Thus, “you ought not to steal” 
really means: “If you steal then you may go to jail.”  Seeing the world only in terms of 
descriptions of existing facts or prescriptions of possible states is a static view.  A dynamic 
world view takes into account state-changes.  The world is not only about static facts (“is” 
statements); it is also about dynamic processes (conditionals).  If any ought statement can 
be recast as a conditional, then Hume’s (supposed) dichotomy breaks down completely. 
67 “Epistemology is the philosophical study of what is ‘knowledge’ (what it is to know) 
and how do we come to know (when do we have  ‘knowledge’).”  Scott DeVito, The 
Ontology of Copyright Infringement: Puzzles, Parts, and Pieces, 35 CONN. L. REV. 817, 817 n.3 
(2003). 
68 “Hume’s scheme jeopardizes the intersubjective ascribability of merit. One might no 
longer be allowed to ask whether tolerance is good, only whether it is good with me or 
with you; or, worse still, with me or you now . . . .”  Falk, supra note 35, at 123, 138. 
69 See, e.g., FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (Helen Zimmern 
trans., 1997), available at http://digital.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num= 
4363 (Project Gutenberg). 
70 James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral 
Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 171 (2000).  “During the nineteenth century, skepticism toward 
the Enlightenment concept of objective truth appeared everywhere, from Bentham’s 
dismissal of natural law as ‘nonsense on stilts’ to Neitzsche’s antifoundationalism.”  Id. 
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defining point of both modernity71 and Nietzsche’s work.  Thus, 
Nietzsche is not a post-modernist:  he is part of the discourse of 
modernity because he believes in progress and makes proposals on how 
to obtain it.  The objective of Nietzsche’s work is the conscious evolution 
of the human species. However, unlike his contemporary and fellow 
modernist Karl Marx,72 who sees the progress of the species as driving 
towards new and better modes of production throughout history, 
Nietzsche defines progress as the ability of the species to genetically 
surpass itself via Darwinian evolution.73  Both are modernists, scientists, 
and materialists, but they take different perspectives on progress.  
Much of what Nietzsche says appears on first glance to be post-
modernist.74  He is certainly skeptical about the truth.  However, 
                                                          
71 Tawia Ansah, A Terrible Purity: International Law, Morality, Religion, Exclusion, 38 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 9, 64, (2005). 
72 See KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Frederick Engels ed., 1936). 
73 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA (Thomas Common trans., 1960) 
[hereinafter NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA]. 
74 Many mistake Nietzsche for a postmodernist.  E.g., Barbara Stark, International Human 
Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence, and Nietzsche’s “Eternal Return”: Turning the Wheel, 19 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 169, 182 n.68 (1996).  Nietzsche’s commitment to objective truth and 
progress place him firmly in the modernist camp.  Even those who recognize some 
problems between Nietzsche and postmodernism fail to recognize just how deep the split 
is.  For example,  
Postmodern thinkers generally trace their intellectual debts back to 
Nietzsche, but Nietzsche stands diametrically opposed to the 
caricature of a postmodern thinker who is paralyzed by the collapse of 
metaphysics and therefore incapable of critical theorizing.  
Consequently, Gadamer’s arguments against Habermas’s critical 
theory do not carry much force in response to Nietzschean critique.  
My thesis is that by understanding how Nietzsche can at once be a 
critical theorist and a postmodern critic of the metaphysical tradition, 
we can develop an important resource for articulating the role of 
critical theory within Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. 
Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
967, 971 (2003).  The ignorance continues: “Friedrich Nietzsche, who has been called the 
‘patron saint of [P]ostmodern philosophy,’ proclaimed the death of God in what amounted 
to a rejection of Modern thought, primarily a rejection of the idea of a ‘unifying center.’”  
Matthew McNeil, The First Amendment out on Highway 61: Bob Dylan, RLUIPA, and the 
Problem with Emerging Postmodern Religion Clauses Jurisprudence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 1040-
41 (2004).  Wrong again.  First, the mixed metaphor of a patron saint of a godless religion is 
inapt.  Nietzsche is not looking to build a church filled with what he and Jesus both 
regarded as sheep.  He is seeking wolves to go hunting with.  Second, and more 
importantly, Nietzsche does not reject modernity.  Rather, he seeks to advance modernity 
to the next stage in its evolution.  A rejection of pre-scientific superstition is a part of 
modernity’s belief in Vorsprung durch Technik—progress through technology.  Nietzsche 
may be a forerunner of postmodernism but is no post-modern.  After all truth skepticism 
goes back all the way to William of Occam.  So calling Nietzsche postmodern on that basis 
would justify calling the pre-modern Occam postmodernist. 
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Nietzsche’s mocking skepticism of the received wisdom, as a product of 
rote repetition of those in power, does not mean he rejects the possibility 
of the existence of truth.  Nietzsche is no nihilist; in fact, he was 
passionate about truth.  For Nietzsche, if truth can exist and is knowable, 
then, once determined, he would defend it with the Wagnerian ardor of 
Gotterdämerung:  “the absolute truth—against itself.”75  It is exactly the 
love of truth that pushed Nietzsche to ask the question, “what is truth?” 
Aristotle describes virtue generally as the median between equally 
opposite and destructive antitheses.76  For example, Aristotle regards the 
virtue of prudence as a median between the extremes of rashness and 
cowardice.77  Though Aristotle counsels prudence, Nietzsche counsels 
the exact opposite.  Nietzsche’s Hyperborean is a man of extremes.  
Nietzsche once said, “I am not a man; I am Dynamite.”78  Like 
Heraclites,79 (who also influenced Marx on this point), Nietzsche believes 
that truth results from conflict.  Thus, though skeptical about existing 
“truths,” Nietzsche believes the truth could exist and, if it does, is worth 
fighting for.  Some post-modernists, with their rejection of universal 
absolutes and ideology, go beyond Nietzsche:  they do not argue for the 
clash of the absolute “truth” against itself.80  Ultimately, they argue that 
                                                          
75 FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, GÖTZEN-DÄMMERUNG bk. 5 (1888), available at 
http://www.gutenberg2000.de//nietzsch/goetzend/goetze05.htm. 
76 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 44-48, bk. 2, ch. 7 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962). 
77 Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto as a Virtue in 
the Tradition of Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1989). 
78 “Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit.”  FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, WARUM ICH EIN 
SCHICKSAL BIN 1 (1889). 
79 HERACLITES, THE FRAGMENTS (b), 8 (c. 500 B.C.), available at http://ratmachines.com/ 
philosophy/heraclites/. 
80 “‘The elevation of rationalism to a position of ultimate authority has created an 
intolerance for ambiguity and subjective beliefs.’”  Erin Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the 
Contemporary Legal Concept of Environmental Injury: An Appeal To Enhance “One-Eyed Reason” 
with a Normative Consciousness, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38 (2004).   
In short, the emergence of moral relativism in Western thought, in 
which it is believed that there are no objective truths and that morals 
are relative and subjective, has led contemporary legal theories to 
reject natural law and other normative concepts.  Alexander offers the 
possibility, however, that it is really the limits of human rationality, 
and not the limits of morality, that prevent us from perceiving 
ultimate, substantive truths.  Alexander contends that by adopting an 
epistemology aware of human limitation, contemporary jurisprudence 
would not develop narrow and short-sighted answers to dilemmas 
that are inherently not objective, not quantifiable, and not concrete.  
Instead, a humbled epistemology demands a jurisprudence that seeks 
the assistance of disciplines other than economics and science such as 
theology and moral philosophy. 
Id. 
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truth is relative to subjective standards.81  However, that proposition 
eventually collapses into the conclusion that there can be no objective 
universal truth, and thus there can be no science (episteme), but rather 
only opinion (doxa).  This failure of moral vision, resulting from an 
erroneous axiology, is exactly what has crippled the Left in the United 
States. 
At first glance, the post-modern argument that “all truth is relative” 
might seem unproblematic.  However, with reflection, it becomes clear 
that saying “all truth is relative” is equivalent to saying “there is no 
objective truth.”  The relativist statement in fact creates a paradox.  That 
fact should tip us off that something may be wrong in the world of 
relativism.  This Article refers to this as the paradox of the “unknowing 
knower”:  if truth does not exist, then how can we know that truth does 
not exist?  Logically speaking, we cannot.  In this way, relativism leads 
us to truth nihilism.  And truth nihilism, in turn, either disintegrates on 
the paradox or degenerates into a pure volonté de puissance82 (i.e., brute 
force).  Relativist thought thus risks degeneration into fascism—if truth 
is unknowable and moral values relative, then only force exists.  And if 
force is the only real argument, then why not be fascist?83  This paradox 
plagues post-modern thought and dooms it to irrelevance—or worse.  
This also explains why the relativist position must be rejected.  Its 
foundational presumptions are wrong, and it leads us nowhere we want 
to go. 
The relativist position is thus easily dispatched by either the paradox 
of the unknowing knower or the reductio ad absurdum that truth nihilism 
and moral relativism can eventually result in fascism.  There are, 
however, better positions of truth skepticism.  Some, such as Nietzsche’s, 
rise to the level of brilliance.84  However, most of them will also fail—
                                                          
81 Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (1991), 
http://www.uta.edu/huma/pomo_theory/. 
82 “Will to power.” 
83 That point also constitutes a general critique of legal positivism.  However, naturalist 
theories of law cannot offer an alternative to legal positivism because they rely at least 
implicitly (in the case of Aquinas explicitly) on Platonic idealism.  This Article suggests that 
any alternative to purely voluntarist theories of law must be founded on an ontology which 
rejects Hume’s dualism just as it must also be founded on an epistemology which rejects 
Plato’s dualism. 
84 In fact, Nietzsche believed that truth, if it exists, is only discovered through the battle 
to the death with its opposite.  For Nietzsche, truth must fight to live: this is his will to 
truth; not the will to shape “truth” out of falsehood, but the will to the battle of truth 
against falsehood.  In this, Nietzsche, like Marx (e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, 
MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), available at http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/26/176.html), harkens back to Heraclites (HERACLITES, supra note 79, at 
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albeit not so quickly or nicely as truth nihilism.  In its more refined form, 
the truth skeptic’s argument against the existence of truth is really only 
an argument against the ability to cognize truth.  The truth skeptic 
argues that truth may (or may not) exist, but even if truth did exist it 
may not be cognized (i.e., known, as such).  The “strong” version of this 
argument, that truth does not exist, has already been shown to be 
flawed.  This weaker version, that the truth is unknowable, leads to the 
same conclusion—that science would be impossible.  It seems almost as 
untenable by reductio.  But what about truth skepticism?  What happens 
if only some truths are unknowable?  Namely, what if we accept the 
validity of our sense impressions and use our perceptions of reality as 
the basis for objective descriptions of reality?  Then some truths would 
be knowable—particularly, truths about material facts—and we would 
be out of the dark (relativism) and back into science.  That is Nietzsche’s 
position—at least some truths are knowable. 
Thus, Nietzsche is faithful to the idea of truth because he rejects 
intersubjectivity.85  Truth may or may not always be knowable, but at 
least sometimes it is, and thus science is possible.  Nietzsche is willing to 
entertain the possibility that truth, or at least some of the truth, could be 
generally incapable of cognition (i.e., formal demonstration).  Basically, 
he admits we might all be staggering around in the dark, and that might 
be inalterable, but he clearly hopes otherwise.  If no truth at all were 
possible, we would not and could not know it.  For this reason, our praxis 
must presume that truth is possible and then fight for it.  
Precisely because Nietzsche defends truth, he accepts that we should 
live in a world of skepticism because it is possible that the truth value of 
some statements may be unknowable (which is a different proposition 
than that there is no truth).  Misapprehension of this fine distinction is 
one reason why post-modernism presents untenable positions.  It 
overstates truth skepticism and elevates it to intersubjective relativism or 
nihilism.  Understanding these errors makes it easier to reject them.  
Rejecting relativism makes it possible to argue from a moral viewpoint 
against economic values as the standard par excellence of political 
discourse. 
But while Nietzsche admits it is possible that we cannot know the 
truth about all objects, he believes that, if only for the practical reason 
stated, it is possible to know the truth about some objects.  Just as 
                                                                                                                                  
(b)).  See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES (erster Hauptstück) 
(1878). 
85 See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT (1882). 
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Nietzsche recognizes the existence of darkness (ignorance) in the 
Platonic cave86 (the material world, specifically The City),87 and points 
out the possible existence of false illumination (the central fire),88 he also 
admits the Apollonian possibility (but not the necessity) that there might 
be the true light of reason89 (the sun in Zarathustra) and that the only 
way to find the light is to ruthlessly question its existence (because of the 
false light).  It is this sort of a critical attitude that is needed to pose the 
questions and find the answers needed to remedy the breakdown of 
American political discourse and its resulting incoherent foreign policy. 
The apotheosis of Nietzsche is cognition of his own ignorance:  he 
knows he does not know.  He has knowledge of his ignorance.  That is, 
proverbially, wisdom.90  All philosophy may or may not begin in 
wonder.91  But all truth begins, often painfully, in the cognition of our 
                                                          
86 See NIETZSCHE, The Sign, in THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at 365, ch. 80.  
Nietzsche describes his higher men—the next evolutionary stage in human development—
as living in a cave: 
In the morning after this night however Zarathustra sprang up from 
his camp, girded his loins, and came out of his CAVE glowing and 
strong, like the dawn’s SUN which comes out from behind dark 
mountains.  You giant star’, he spoke, as he had first spoken ‘you deep 
eye of luck and joy, what would be your joy and happiness if you did 
not have they whom you enlighten!/And if they remain in their 
chambers while you are already awake and come to give and share - 
how would your pride be upbraided!/Well!  They still sleep these 
higher men, while I am awake.  They are not my true comrades.  I do 
not await them here in my mountains!/I want to go to my work, to my 
day: but they do not understand what the signs of my morning are, my 
step is for them no wake up call./They still sleep in my cave . . . . 
Id. 
87 Id. at  Zarathustra’s Prologue (especially pt.3: “The Rope Dancer”). 
88 PLATO, The Allegory of the Cave, in THE REPUBLIC bk. VII (360 B.C.E.), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/pla/republic.htm.  “This wanderer is no stranger to me: 
many years ago he went by here. He is called Zarathustra; but he has changed.  Then you 
carried your ASHES to the mountains: do you want to carry FIRE to the valleys? Do you 
not fear the arsonist’s punishment?”  Id.; see NIETZSCHE, Zarathustra’s Prologue, in THUS 
SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73 (author’s translation).  Like Prometheus, Zarathustra 
brings men fire, yet he brings not the truth of reason (the sun) but the stolen Promethean 
fire.  Is it a lie? 
89 He does this in his metaphor about the sun. 
90  He who knows not and knows not that he knows not, is a fool . . . shun 
him.  He who knows not and knows that he knows not, is 
ignorant . . . teach him. He who knows and knows not that he knows, 
is asleep . . . wake him.  He who knows and knows that he knows, is a 
wise man . . . follow him. 
Knows and Knows, http://www.xenodochy.org/ex/quotes/knowsnot.html (last visited Jan. 
27, 2007) (Persian proverb). 
91 PLATO, THEAETETUS (360 B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu. 
html (citing Socrates). 
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own ignorance.  Nietzsche’s entire work is defined around his reaction to 
his own ignorance.  Americans are ignorant of foreign languages,92 
geography, histories, religions, and cultures.93  One can rightly ask:  Are 
American’s deliberately kept ignorant of foreign cultures and languages 
to make them more manipulable?  Whether the ignorance is calculated or 
merely the result of physical isolation from the rest of the world, 
Americans can no longer afford the luxury of monolingualism and 
Amero-centrism.  Only if Americans become conscious of their ignorance 
and take steps to cure it can they avoid the pain their ignorance causes.  
Americans do not know and think they know.94 
They approach a vast complex world with simplistic universalist 
ideals, which are generally perverted and cynically used to advance a 
corporatist agenda.  Worse, the occasional Left attempt to thwart the 
corporatist agenda is crippled by relativism, which is also an example of 
knowing not that one knows not.  Correcting the flawed relativism 
would empower efforts to oppose corporatism.  Understanding the 
complexities of the world is a necessary first step to avoid “living in a 
glass towers and throwing stones.”  But an entire reconceptualization not 
only of history and geography and language, but also the proper role of 
America in the world and of moral choice is necessary to stop the stone 
throwing and the counter-stone throwing.   
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, we see Nietzsche, as Zarathustra, reject 
society and the crowd (i.e., The City, to seek the “all seeing eye”—the 
sun, representing Apollonian truth).95  However, even after this 
illumination, when he returns to The City he discovers he is still 
ignorant.  For why else would the crowd reject him?  Why else would 
the risk-takers and rope-dancers—the innovative catalysts of progress, 
                                                          
92 “I spoke in English, but no one minded that.  Everyone expects Americans to be ignorant 
of any foreign language.”  Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitution-Building in the Former Soviet Union, 
GREEN BAG, 1998, at 168 (emphasis added). 
93 “[P]opular American culture reflects broad ignorance of overseas events and foreign 
affairs.”  Raymond M. Brown, I Into Thou: American Resistance to Narratives of International 
Humanitarian Law Violations, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
94 Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of 
Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 683 n.42 (1998). 
Americans have neither the tradition nor the necessity of living 
internationally.  Their ignorance about foreign countries, cultures and 
customs, their lack of linguistic abilities, and their inability to always 
respect foreign sensitivities are entirely understandable. . . .  [Others] 
take offense [however] when . . . American ignorance goes arm-in-arm 
with American arrogance. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
95 NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73. 
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his Heroes, forerunners of the next Man—plummet to their death?  Only 
Nietzsche’s/Zarathustra’s ignorance of the limitations of homo sapiens 
could explain the masses’ rejection of enlightenment.  Though Nietzsche 
is rejected by the masses, he does not himself reject logical scientific 
truth.  Rather, he believes that he has perceived an uncomfortable 
objective truth—that humanity, as it is, is not capable of perceiving or 
accepting all of the truth.  
This is also the conclusion of Leo Strauss96 and Machiavelli.97  
However, Nietzsche does not share another conclusion of Strauss and 
Machiavelli—that one should be economical with the truth and use it 
sparingly for tactical advantages.  Instead, Nietzsche takes a radical 
strategy that, if correct, perhaps outmaneuvers Marx:  if humanity as it 
exists on the whole is beneath the standard of rationality, risk-taking, 
and facing hard truths, then humanity must evolve beyond itself.98  
Nietzsche’s objective is no less than to push the human species into the 
next phase of its upward evolutionary spiral.99  Marx seeks to advance 
the human species as a collective methodically through technological 
progress.  Nietzsche, in contrast, seeks out individuals who are “higher 
types,” precursors of the next strain of homo, to determine how to 
cultivate such exceptions to mediocrity so that their numbers will grow.  
Like Marx, he is trying to push the society forward following the logic of 
modernity, “progress,” but in a very different way.  Such projects, 
however, are impossible without scientific truth.   
Both strategies simply outmaneuver dishonest tacticians like Leo 
Strauss or Machiavelli, who are playing for much lower stakes and are 
strategically blinded because of their tactical choice to deploy 
dishonesty.  It is this sort of tactical “shrewdness” that leads the Left to 
wrongly reject moral discourse.  Hoping to outmaneuver conservative 
moralists, most of the Left has abandoned the idea of morality.  That, 
                                                          
96 “Strauss believed that the essential truths about human society and history should be 
held by an elite, and [h]e held that philosophy is dangerous because it brings into question 
the conventions on which civil order and the morality of society depend.”  R. Alta Charo, 
Passing on the Right: Conservative Bioethics Is Closer than It Appears, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 307, 
311 (2004). 
97 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 139, 143 (Bernard R. Crick ed. & Leslie J. 
Walker trans., Penguin 1970) (1520).  Machiavelli, like Plato, counseled religious hypocrisy.  
Id. 
98 NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at sec. 3, available at 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/zara/als2003.htm.  “Ich lehre euch den Übermenschen.  
Der Mensch ist Etwas, das überwunden werden soll.”  Id. 
99 NIETZSCHE, On the Higher Men, in THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at bk. IV, 
sec. 3.  “Zarathustra aber fragt als der Einzige und Erste: ``wie wird der Mensch 
überwunden?’“  Id. 
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however, shifts all debates to economic values where the Left is doomed 
to lose because any redistributive agenda entails transaction costs and 
thus is uneconomical:  slavery is profitable.  By tactically sacrificing the 
idea of morality in vain hopes of evading conservative moralists, the Left 
commits a grave strategic error because the debates are then shifted out 
of the sphere of morality (where persons have inalienable value) to the 
sphere of the market where all is bought and sold according to the logic 
of profit.  However, the worst excesses of that can be avoided with a 
correct appreciation of Nietzsche.  Nietzsche is not a nihilist; he is not 
even a relativist.  Rather, Nietzsche is a moralist, but his morality is anti-
Christian.  A correct appreciation of Nietzsche’s contribution to a 
scientific understanding of morality would allow the Left to diminish, 
and even escape, its strategic error (the fool’s mate) at the hands of 
economists, gained for a tactical advantage over the conservative 
moralists (the knight’s gambit). 
In sum, Nietzsche, though cryptic, is no liar.  He is a truth skeptic 
and is ultimately a scientist.  His scientificity comes through most clearly 
in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (cognitively, The Frolicking Science, eu-
logos—in some sense a eulogy for Ignorance).100  He believes in truth.  
But his faith in truth is not the blind faith of religion:  his faith in truth is 
founded on a skeptical experiential inquiry guided by a teleology only 
dimly perceived by most—a conscious effort to force the evolution of the 
human species.  Post-modernists who see Nietzsche as their role model 
simply do not know what modernity is or what Nietzsche was saying 
about progress, truth, and science.  
2. Gödel, Quine, Saussure 
Roots of post-modernism and relativism have been seen in 
Nietzsche, and the reason for their misapprehension has been explained.  
Nietzsche is not the only source of confusion among post-modernists 
and other relativists.  The most defensible position that seems relativist is 
the cognitive skeptic’s argument that we should distrust what we are 
told is truth and that truth may not always be knowable.  Other 
defensible roots of indefensible positions can be seen in the works of 
Kurt Gödel, Willard Quine, and Ferdinand de Saussure.  
Gödel’s famous theorem, that in a closed formal system all true 
theorems cannot be proven and all false theorems cannot be disproven, 
supports the cognitive skeptic’s argument that truth cannot always be 
                                                          
100 NIETZSCHE, DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT, supra note 85. 
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known.101  When understood, Gödel’s complex idea is a powerful one, 
but does not compel relativism in any way.  Similarly, Saussure argues 
that the sign is an arbitrary value:102  for Saussure, there is no underlying 
universal root language common to all world languages.103  Willard 
Quine argues that language is inevitably indeterminate as every term is 
mutually defined.104  Ultimately, the sign is arbitrary—anything can 
stand for anything else.105   
How correct is relativist epistemology?  Though signs are mutually 
defined, they are not exclusively so defined.  The sign is not completely 
arbitrary because certain signs are reflections of material facts and 
because some words are indeed onomatopoetic.  Linguistic determinacy 
is secured by anchoring signs in material objects.  Representations of 
Quine that argue that his work implies that legal discourse be 
indeterminate because all argument is ultimately tautological miss the 
point and take Quine too far.  All argument is ultimately founded on 
axioms and postulates, and thus is ultimately tautological.  However, 
maneuvering from axioms and postulates to theorems must nonetheless 
result from internally consistent rule generation methods, which may be 
valid or invalid.  Their validity is a reflection of material facts and 
material processes.  Law is like a formal system, an abstract game with 
rules of production, axioms, postulates, and theorems.    
Truth skepticism—unlike nihilism or relativism—is defensible.  
Language may (or may not) be an intersubjective construct.  However, 
language is only indeterminate when we engage in the dualist error of 
seeing language as pure idea with no connection to the material objects 
that it describes and reflects.  Most of the flaws in Western theory arise 
out of dualism.106  If the Left were to reject dualism, numerous 
dependant issues would fall into place.  But so long as the Left follows 
dualism, it will be presented with blind alleys and rabbit trails.  
                                                          
101 K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter 
Systeme, I. MONATSHEFTE FÜR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 38, 173-98 (1931), translated in van 
Heijenoort: From Frege to Gödel (Harvard Univ. Press 1971), available at 
http://home.ddc.net/ygg/etext/godel/. 
102 See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, THIRD COURSE OF LECTURES ON GENERAL LINGUISTICS 
(1910), available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/ 
saussure.htm. 
103 See id. 
104 W. V. O. QUINE, WORDS AND OBJECTS (1960). 
105 PETER BICHSEL, “Ein Tisch ist ein Tisch,” in KINDERGESCHICHTEN (Berlin und Neuwied 
1969). 
106 Dualism is a flawed theory.  See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 612 n.42 (2001); Richard Hyland, The Spinozist, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 805, 822 (1992). 
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However, a monist-materialist perspective allows us to escape from 
the problem of linguistic indeterminacy as the sign, even if syntactically 
arbitrary, is not semantically arbitrary because the sign is a reflection of a 
material object.  As the syntax of the sign is intersubjective and its object 
is objective, signs are determinate functions.  Language is not 
semantically arbitrary because objective knowledge exists.  Additionally, 
because objective knowledge exists, knowledge, whether an objective 
morality, exists and the content of that morality is possible.  Again, 
resituating the Left’s discourse in moral terms allows the Left to obtain 
the long absent traction needed to advance its arguments. 
As this Article will show, the axiology that flows from dualism and 
relativism is fundamentally flawed.  That flawed axiology, when 
consciously rejected, allows the Left to argue coherently for moral 
positions. Whenever the Left has taken up the failed relativist axiology to 
oppose conservative moralism, it has lost.  It has neither changed the 
mind of the conservative moralists nor implemented its alternative 
vision of reality.  Instead, it has undercut its own moral force.  The Left, 
by taking up the failed relativist axiology has tried to develop and 
implement legal methods that distort discourse and mute critique of the 
dominant paradigm in the legal and political arena.  Taking up the failed 
relativist axiology prevents effective legal reform.  This failed axiology 
leads to incoherent political positions and incoherence in contemporary 
political discourse.  Understanding the source of these distortions is the 
first step in ending them. Ending the distorted and incoherent legal and 
political debates by taking up a correct monist and materialist axiology is 
a necessary step to rectifying injustice.  
C. Constructivism:  Popper 
We have already seen that, for Plato, our ideas construct the 
universe.  Constructivism argues that knowledge is not discovered; 
rather, it is created socially, and thus is constructed.  For example, 
Saussure is a constructivist.107  Truth is not objective for the 
constructivist, rather it is intersubjective.  However, the constructivist 
position runs into the same obstacles as relativism.  Some facts clearly 
are not socially constructed.   
Similar to constructivism, and another possible root of relativism, is 
the falsification thesis of Popper.  For Popper, like Nietzsche, all 
                                                          
107 SAUSSURE, supra note 102. 
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knowledge is tentative.108  However, Popper also argues that science is 
not the discovery or affirmation of positions, but rather the falsification 
and rejection of competing theories.109  For Popper, it is not that we know 
that P is true, but rather that we know that not P is false.110  Again, this is 
similar to Nietzsche because it implies a sort of epistemological 
Darwinism, where easily falsified ideas fail quickly and less easily 
falsified ones continue to exist until finally disproved, but the surviving 
ideas are still subject to the possibility of falsification.  Popper’s position 
is quite defensible, and it is an example of what might appear to be 
relativism, yet is in fact good science.111  Essentially, Popper is arguing 
that knowledge is tentative and refutable, which is a position of classic 
modern science since Francis Bacon.112  But when we see that skepticism 
is a root belief of the scientific method that leads us to a paradox, which 
might please Marx, the scientific method sows the seeds of its own 
destruction.113  The skepticism of the scientific method has prepared the 
ground for the intersubjectivist thesis that knowledge is socially 
constructed out of subjective experience.  But that, if true, would imply 
the impossibility of objective knowledge and of science. 
D. Intersubjectivism 
According to relativists, all knowledge is subjective and socially 
constructed into an intersubjective reality, except for the knowledge that 
knowledge is relative and intersubjective.  Thus, intersubjectivism leads 
us to nothing other than a slightly more elaborate variant of the paradox 
of the unknowing knower.  This regress into paradox can be avoided 
                                                          
108 KARL R. POPPER, The Problem of Induction, in POPPER SELECTIONS 101, 104 (David Miller 
ed., 1985).  “[T]he whole apparatus of induction becomes unnecessary once we admit the 
general fallibility of human knowledge, . . . the conjectural character of human 
knowledge. . . . [S]cientific knowledge is essentially conjectural or hypothetical.”  Id. 
109 KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (1972). 
110  Popper’s famous explanatory example is rendered thus by Bryan 
Magee, “although no number of observation statements reporting 
observations of white swans allow us logically to derive the universal 
statement ‘All swans are white’, one single observation statement, 
reporting one single observation of a black swan, allows us logically to 
derive the statement ‘Not all swans are white.’” 
Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir Basil 
Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, 80 TUL. L. REV. 169, 184 (2005). 
111 See, e.g., Karl Popper, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/. 
112 FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON OR TRUE DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF NATURE ch. LXX (1620), available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
bacon/nov_org.htm. 
113 See also Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, reprinted in 
COMMUNISM, FASCISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-89 (Carl Cohen ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
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only if one admits the possibility of the objective knowledge of the 
subjectivity of knowledge.  But if we admit that there is an objective 
epistemology, then why should objectivity be limited to epistemology?  
If epistemology can be objective, then why could an objective moral 
science or physical science not also be possible?  So the regress, if denied 
by that step, lets us get back into an objective view of the world.  And the 
material facts of the objective world contradict the constructivist and 
relativist position.  It is an objective fact that water always boils at a 
certain temperature, regardless what we think or say about it.  Thus, an 
unqualified non-cognitivist stance can be cogently defended, if at all, 
only with great difficulty, namely by admitting a position that sneaks 
objectivity into the supposedly intersubjective universe through the back 
door.  
Why defend these awkward positions?  Awkward positions such as 
these are the result of the sort of tactical gambits of the realists and the 
truth economies recommended by Strauss and Machiavelli.  In this case, 
the supposed Left wing gambit, namely masking a Leftist morality in the 
guise of moral relativism or scientific neutrality after Weber (sometimes 
even relying on a radical individualist libertarian argument which is 
another strategic error) backfires—which would probably delight 
Strauss—and hopefully demonstrates the danger of using the truth 
sparingly. 
The Left critique of morality attempts to undermine moral values 
with which the Left disagrees, usually in an attempt to liberate the 
subject from power.114  This explains why radical individualism and/or 
libertarian arguments are sometimes made in bad defenses of Left wing 
agendas.  Those arguments ultimately backfire, however, because 
capitalism is individualistic and based on money.  This is not the only 
way that supposed radicals, by taking opportunistic gambits, err.  
Undermining moral values elevates market values115 as the only 
objective scientific value. As most money is controlled by men, 
undermining moral values leads to elevating market values, which, in 
turn, leads to augmenting the power of men.116  Thus, the pseudo-Left 
gambit reinforces patriarchy and reiterates the hierarchy of the rich as 
                                                          
114 On the liberation of the subject from power see, e,g., Eric Engle, The Torture Victim’s 
Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. 
REV. 501 (2003), or anything by Foucault. 
115 Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 481, 483 n.18. (2005). 
116 See, e.g., Krysia Kubiak, History of the Women in the Law Division Gender Bias 
Subcommittee, LAWYERS J., Oct. 27, 2006, at 4 (discussing slow pace and continuing reality of 
sex inequality in the legal profession). 
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more valuable than the poor.  So rather than being a clever ruse or 
tactical advantage, that move is a clear loser as it twice loops right back 
into inequality.   
How would materialist ontology impact the truth constructivist 
argument?  Basically, the constructivists argue that knowledge (i.e., 
verifiable statements of truth and falsehood) is constructed in an 
intersubjective world.  However, if truth statements are objectively 
verifiable (i.e., if truth is an objective fact), then truth cannot be created 
but only discovered.  And if truth is not created, but “merely” 
discovered, then the constructivist argument of a pure positive science 
collapses.  This is wonderful for science, but it is terrible for moral 
relativism and explains why the relativist positions are generally 
indefensible.   
Having seen how post-modern epistemology collapses due to a 
subjectivism, which ultimately denies the possibility of science, this 
Article now turns to analyzing how this subjectivism cripples post-
modern thought, preventing it from shaping vigorous normative 
propositions about acknowledged social problems and, in fact, reinforces 
patriarchy, hierarchy, and inequality by evacuating the moral sphere of 
all values other than market values.  
III.  AXIOLOGICAL BASIS OF REALIST LEGAL METHOD 
In Part II it was shown that the epistemological relativism was a non-
starter and that a moral theory was at least possible, as knowledge is 
possible.  Part III shows that an objective materialist moral theory is 
possible.  Morality, in materialist terms, is that which enables the human 
animal to survive and not merely to survive, but also to prosper and 
obtain the good life.  With an objective morality, a normative discourse 
outside of economic terms becomes possible, which in turn enables the 
Left agenda to be implemented.  
Several of the epistemological positions of relativism and 
constructivism, if properly qualified, appear defensible.  Aristotle 
considered social justice as founded on an axiology, which was not 
natural, but varied dependant on the society one examined.117  What 
modernity calls social justice is, for Aristotle (who called it distributive or 
                                                          
117 See Aristotle, Politics, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH bk. II, 
ch. V (Benjamin Jowett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966). 
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geometric justice),118 not a natural, but a positive function and it varies 
from society to society.119  Thus, it may not be surprising that the 
axiological positions of relativism appear to be less subject to critique 
than the epistemological positions.  However, the axiological positions of 
relativism are nonetheless hard to defend. 
Moral relativism, reflected in Weber’s value-free neutrality,120 
essentially asserts that either (1) moral values do not exist, that they are 
in fact purely subjective elements of personal taste,121 or (2) even if moral 
values do exist, they are not capable of cognition.  Epistemological 
relativism implies axiological relativism (though the reverse is not true), 
which implies that the existence of moral values is unknowable.  
However, some values, such as the inherent value of human life, are 
universal.122  A rough factual moral standard can be the tendency of an 
act or acts to foster the survival of the human species.  Such a standard is 
not subjective; it is based in the material world.  Thus, it is capable of 
scientific verification—that is, a materialist and not a platonic or neo-
platonic formal idealist measure. 
The reason that moral relativism appears attractive to those who 
would critique Western values is because Western moral theory neither 
prevented nor sanctioned witch hunts,123 crusades,124 slavery,125 
imperialism,126 and world wars (the most obvious evidence of failure of 
Western morality); it actually often encouraged such brutality and 
                                                          
118 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 107 (D.P. Chase trans., Ernest Rhys ed., J. M. 
Dent & Sons Ltd. 1911). 
119 Aristotle, Politics, supra note 117, at bk. V. 
120 MAX WEBER, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Heary A. Finch trans. & eds., 1949).  Like 
Hume, Weber is only proposing a prudent methodological counsel as a way to avoid 
confusion. 
121 “Understanding and ‘taste’ (by which merit is discovered) address themselves to 
different issues.  The one is the ‘discovery of truth and falsehood’ the other the importance 
of things to us . . . their relevance for us as things to be responded to with favor or 
disfavor.”  Falk, supra note 35, at 554.  “Because merit is discerned by taste it is not and 
cannot be among the facts discovered by the understanding.”  Id. at 551. 
122 Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 148 (2005). 
123 Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & 
L. 43, 51 (2005). 
124 Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto, Democracy’s Global Quest: A Noble Crusade 
Wrapped in Dirty Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 216 (2005). 
125 See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence: 
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Condemnation of the Precept 
of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695 (1996). 
126 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
881, 892 (1998). 
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inhumanity.127  All too often, the old “moral” values were immoral.  
However, rejecting a failed moral system is itself a moral choice.  Moral 
relativism can neither claim normative power nor reject other theories of 
morality—that would require a value judgment.  Relativists regard value 
judgments as meaningless or impossible, and thus impermissible.   
In fact, however, we can and do have objective material standards by 
which we can judge the moral worth of any society—namely, the life 
expectancy of its members and several other indicia as well (e.g., infant 
mortality, literacy, homelessness).  When radical scholars wish to reject 
the failed Western morality, they should not take the relativist gambits 
because (1) with no moral ground to stand on, their own arguments can 
become relativized, and thus marginalized; and (2) rejecting moral 
arguments leads to an augmentation in the power of the market as 
arbiter of male power (because men control most of the money) and 
individualism.  
A. Hume and Kelsen 
The presupposition that moral values are statements about facts, and 
not themselves facts, can be traced to David Hume, who is the last major 
root of erroneous post-modern thought that we will examine.  Hume, in 
turn, influenced Kelsen to adopt this dualism.  For Hume and Kelsen, 
there is an essential and ineluctable difference between statements of fact 
(“is” statements) and statements about facts (“ought” statements).128  For 
Hume, to state that there is insufficient food in Ireland to feed the Irish is 
a statement of fact:  either there are or are not X kilograms of wheat 
needed to feed Y persons to avert starvation.  A statement, however, that 
there is insufficient food to feed the Irish (Somalians), and thus one 
ought to donate food to them is, according to Hume, an “ought” 
statement.  Hume is generally presented as rejecting the viability of 
“ought” statements as being implicit in “is” statements, and thus as 
rejecting normative and practical syllogisms.129  That representation, 
however, is inexact.130  Hume does infer norms.131  But proper normative 
                                                          
127 Hart, then Fuller describes this as the problem of “immoral morality.”  Lon L. Fuller, 
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). 
128 “It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference 
[from is to ought] was David Hume.”  Capaldi, supra note 34, at 126. 
129 HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 29 (asking readers to note the 
distinction between is and ought statements and to explain how one can be derived from 
the other—and nothing more nor anything less). 
130  Hume’s point in the Inquiry, and in the ‘is-ought’ passage, if read in the 
light of his comments in the Inquiry, is not to deny that merit is 
cognitively derived from fact but to make sure that this derivation is 
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inference,132 according to Hume, must be explicitly declared.133  In fact, 
                                                                                                                                  
not mistaken for deduction. . . .  The Inquiry, more so than the Treatise, 
shows Hume’s concern in this matter to be two-edged: to ward off the 
entrenched confusion of evaluative inference with demonstrative 
proof; and to show what cognitive procedure is instead. . . .  Hume’s 
point is that the facts as known are the basis, not of a formal, but rather 
of an experimental, proof . . . . 
Werner David Falk, Hume on Is and Ought, CANADIAN J. PHIL.  562-63 (1976). 
131 “Hume makes it clear that he believes that factual considerations can justify or fail to 
justify moral rules.”  MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 485, 489. 
132 While Hume is skeptical about causality and thus deduction, he is even more radical 
in his critique of induction:  
[A]n assumption that arguments must be either deductive or 
defective . . . is the very assumption which underlies Hume’s 
skepticism about induction.  And this skepticism is commonly treated 
as resting upon, and certainly does rest upon, a misconceived 
demand, . . . ”the demand that induction shall be shown to be really a 
kind of deduction.”  This is certainly an accurate way of characterizing 
Hume’s transition from the premise that “there can be no demonstrative 
arguments to prove, that those instances of which we have had no 
experience resemble those of which we have had experience” to the 
conclusion that “it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our 
reason, why we should extend that experience beyond those particular 
instances which have fallen under our observation.”  Part of Hume’s 
own point is that to render inductive arguments deductive is a useless 
procedure.  We can pass from “The kettle has been on the fire for ten 
minutes” to “So it will be boiling by now” (Strawson’s example) by 
way of writing in some such major premise as “Whenever kettles have 
been on the fire for ten minutes, they boil.”  But if our problem is that 
of justifying induction, then this major premise itself embodies an 
inductive assertion that stands in need of justification.  For the 
transition which constitutes the problem has been justified in the 
passage from minor premise to conclusion only at the cost of 
reappearing, as question-beggingly as ever, within the major premise.  
To fall back on some yet more general assertion as a premise . . . would 
be to embark on a regress, possibly infinite and certainly pointless. 
Id. at 487. 
[S]ince Hume holds in some passages on induction at least that 
arguments are deductive or defective, we could reasonably expect him 
to maintain that since factual premises cannot entail moral 
conclusion . . . there can be no connections between factual statements 
and moral judgments . . . .  [H]is remarks on “is” and “ought” are not 
only liable to receive but have actually received a wrong 
interpretation. 
Id. at 488. 
133  What I have so far argued is that Hume himself derives “ought” from 
“is” in his account of justice. Is he then inconsistent with his own 
doctrine in that famous passage?  Someone might try to save Hume’s 
consistency by pointing out that the derivation of “ought” from “is” in 
the section on justice is not an entailment and that all Hume is denying 
is that “is” statements can entail “ought” statements, and that this is 
quite correct. 
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the practical syllogism evident by the example of a famine is obvious.  
We must feed the poor not only for pleasant altruistic reasons, but also 
for practical ones:  desperate people do desperate things; therefore, 
alleviating famine reduces the likelihood of being attacked or robbed.  
Positive reasons exist as well.  By aiding the victims of famine, their 
descendants may be more favorable to our descendants.  Of course, 
humanity also provides a practical justification to explain why the fact of 
famine implies the act of feeding.  We are social animals, we are not 
cannibals, and part of what separates us from sharks is the fact that we 
have compassion for the weak.  All of this shows the practical measure of 
morality as that which ensures species survival seems more or less self 
evident and is, in all events, an objectively measurable universally 
admitted good.  
For Hume and Kelsen, the difference between “is” and “ought” is 
ineluctable and essential.  Hume presents this dualistic difference as a 
postulate:  he does not seek to prove the existence of that difference; he 
sees it as fundamental (i.e., axiomatic).  Hume thus does not raise or 
refute the idea that “ought” statements might also be fact—an alternative 
possibility this Article presents.  The idea that Hume’s “law” holds that 
statements of “is” and “ought” are fundamentally different and that the 
one cannot be derived from the other is an interpolation of Hume based 
on a presumption that he did not necessarily make.  It is certainly not the 
only possible interpretation of Hume.134  Further, Hume’s dualism is not 
a necessary (i.e., inevitable, position, and generates theoretical 
                                                                                                                                  
Id. at 492. 
134 See, e.g., Barbara Winters, Hume on Reason, in I HUME STUD. 229, 234 (1979), available at 
http://departments.oxy.edu/philosophy/hs/issues/v5n1/winters/winters-v5n1.pdf. 
[Hume] is arguing that if reason is viewed on the traditional 
conception, then reason does not determine us to have beliefs, e.g. 
about the unobserved.  But he does not stop with this result.  Hume is 
trying to give an account of human nature based on an examination of 
how we in fact operate, and when he investigates the processes that go 
on in us in coming to believe things, he comes to a discovery that we 
do reason to our beliefs, but what goes on when we reason is not what 
was traditionally thought to occur.  His empirical investigation, then, 
results in a different understanding of what reason is like, and when 
reason is viewed according to his interpretation it can be seen that in 
making the transition from the observed to the unobserved we are 
reasoning and inferring.  I see Hume, then, as rejecting reason under 
one conception as inoperative in human affairs, but arguing that if 
conceived in another way, reason does cause belief and influence 
action.  This interpretation, which I develop below, will resolve the 
paradoxes and explain the inconsistency between Book I and Books II 
and III. 
Id. 
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inconsistency).  Moreover, courts infer from facts to norms (induction)135 
and from norms to facts (deduction) all the time.   
Those who interpolate Hume as arguing that “ought” can never be 
deduced136 from “is” overstate Hume.137  He does not say that the 
derivation of “ought” from “is” is impossible.138  He certainly does not 
                                                          
135 “Under stare decisis, contrary to Hume’s law, courts may indeed derive, to some 
extent, an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ as the mere fact that cases were decided in a certain manner 
in the past lends normative force toward deciding like cases in a like manner in the future.”  
Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 863, 866 (2001). 
136 In fact Hume criticizes deduction because what is taken for causal may only be—
perhaps even can only be—coincidence: 
I have found that such an object has always been attended with such 
an effect, and I foresee that other objects, which are, in appearance, 
similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you 
please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I 
know in fact, that it always is inferred.  But if you insist that the 
inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that 
reasoning. 
4 DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 30 (Green & Grose eds., Scientia Verlag 1964) 
[hereinafter HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS].  “All inferences from experience therefore, 
are effects of custom, not of reasoning.”  Id. 
All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species 
of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, 
which we have observed to result from similar causes.  Where the 
causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, 
drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man 
ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have 
weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances which have ever 
fallen under his observation.  But where the objects have not so exact a 
similarity, the analogy is less perfect and the inference is less 
conclusive; though it still has some force, in proportion to the degree of 
similarity. 
Id. at 85.  “[M]en, learn many things from experience and infer, that the same events will 
always follow from the same causes.”  Id. 
137 For example, 
the standard interpretation of this passage takes Hume to be asserting 
here that no set of nonmoral premises can entail a moral conclusion. It 
is further concluded that Hume therefore is a prime opponent of what 
Prior had called “the attempt to find a ‘foundation’ for morality that is 
not already moral.”  Hume becomes, in this light, an exponent of the 
autonomy of morality and in this at least akin to Kant.  In this paper, I 
want to show that this interpretation is inadequate and misleading. 
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 486. 
138 Falk noted: 
[Hume] denies the deductibility of the latter from the former, as the 
‘ought’ expresses ‘a new relation or affirmation’, ‘entirely different 
from the others’. And this is commonly taken as saying that the ought 
statement is ‘different’ and nondeducible, because it is no longer a 
‘purely factual statement,’ to wit one that makes another ordinarily 
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say there is no connection between them.  Hume says that whoever 
wishes to make the transition from “is” to “ought” must explicitly 
enumerate exactly how they make that transition.139  In other words, 
Hume presents a prudential council:140  it is wise for a philosopher to 
explicitly show the connection between his normative and factual 
statements,141 as this clarifies thinking both for the philosopher and his 
audience. 
Thus, Hume’s “law” is not a “law.”  It appears, on closer 
examination, to be a mere prudential council.  However, a critical 
examination will also show that Hume’s “law” is in fact a trap for the 
unwary.142  Hume does not say that moral values do not exist or cannot 
be cognized.  Rather, Hume’s critique is a much more subtle143 challenge 
to all who wish to present moral choices as objective values to explicitly 
do so.  In other words, Hume merely and properly places the burden of 
proof upon the movant to show that moral values exist objectively as 
fact.  As he presupposes a fundamental difference between “is” and 
                                                                                                                                  
testable truth claim.  However, recent criticism, by W.D. Hudson and 
others, points out that Hume says other things seemingly inconsistent 
with this. . . .  How is one to understand Hume so as to save him here 
from incoherence?  It is said by Antony Flew that Hume really meant 
that moral statements, rather than being about attitudes, serve to 
express them. The real Hume was the ancestor of noncognitivism and 
the ‘is-ought’ passage its early charter. By contrast, it is said by 
Alasdair MacIntyre that really Hume did not mean to deny 
deducibility.  When he said that it ‘seemed inconceivable’, he meant 
that it only seemed so without really being so 
Falk, supra note 35, at 551. 
139 “Hume’s point . . . is not to deny that merit is cognitively derived from fact but to 
make sure that this derivation is not mistaken for deduction.”  Id. at 562. 
140 “Hume . . . in the celebrated passage does not mention entailment. What he does is to 
ask how and if moral rules may be inferred from factual statements, and in the rest of Book 
III of the Treatise he provides an answer to his own question.”  MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 
493. 
141 “[I]n all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not 
supported by any argument or process of understanding.”  HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
WORKS, supra note 136, at 36. 
142  [O]ur willingness to accept the normative conception of ethics is so 
deeply embedded that, when someone such as Hume challenges it, 
we take the challenge as a classic defense. (I-O) is not the foundation 
of normative ethics but its death warrant. Perhaps the shock value of 
this revelation will lead us to reconsider what might be the most 
important issue in twentieth-century philosophy. 
Hudson, supra note 37, at 508. 
143 “Hume’s attitude to induction is much more complex than appears in his more 
skeptical moments and is therefore liable to misinterpretation—his remarks on ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ are not only liable to receive but have actually received a wrong interpretation.”  
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 488. 
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“ought,” this burden of proof cannot in fact be met, at least not within 
Hume’s dualistic universe.144  The only way out of Hume’s trap is to 
recognize it as dualism145 and reject the presumption of dualism.  It 
seems to me that Hume has not proven the existence of “is” versus 
“ought,” but rather presumes it.  Therefore, just as Hume can rightly 
insist that the practical syllogism be founded on explicitly declared 
presumptions, we can also insist that Hume prove his dualist position.  
From a monist perspective, moral statements are simply statements 
of facts—another “is” statement.146  For example, just as it is a fact that 
the sun rises, it is also a fact that certain persons believe that others ought 
not kill.  Dualism runs throughout Western thought and is at the root of 
alienation, division, separation, and suffering. Plato’s “mind” (eidos) 
“matter” (hulé) distinction may be the first recorded example of dualism 
in Western thought.  It is not the last.  Plato essentially presumes the 
existence of the eidos as a postulate and never proves it, much as Hume 
assumes a dualism which he does not prove.147  In fact, Plato’s dualism 
cannot be proven, as material objects would not be the measure of proof 
of mental forms.  Thus, platonic formalism does not admit to proof by 
materialist standards of science.  Christianity makes a similar god/man 
                                                          
144 “Hume observes, that the good divides from the true. The standard for the latter is 
‘eternal and inflexible’ in being founded on ‘the nature of things’; while that for the former 
is variable, in depending on ‘the internal frame and constitution of animals.’”  Falk, supra 
note 35, at  565. 
145 “In short, Hume is rejecting any normative conception of morals.”  Capaldi, supra note 
34, at 134.  Is that statement circular?  If normativity and morality are synonyms, then it is.  
Hume has been accused by recent scholars of equivocation.  A view upholding a univocal 
reading of such terms, then attributes to Hume the position that we reason to and infer 
such beliefs, that such transitions are ones of reasoning, but that reason doesn’t produce the 
beliefs.  And it must hold that, despite the fact that Hume concludes that animals have 
reason from the fact that they make some of the same inferences that we do, he believes 
that in the human realm such examples of reasoning are not produced by reason.  It must 
claim that whatever faculty is which Hume thinks reasons and infers, it is not reason.  
Winters, supra note 134, at 233. 
146 Hume is a materialist: 
How does Hume defend his view of the derivation of morality from 
interest?  By appeal to the facts.  How do we in fact induce someone to 
do what is just?  How do we in fact justify actions on our own part?  In 
observing what answers we have to give to questions like these, Hume 
believes that his analysis is justified. 
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 491.  But, unfortunately, Hume is also a dualist.  “All 
reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely demonstrative reasoning, or that 
concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and 
existence.”  HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, supra note 136, at 31.  It is his dualism that 
leads to his trouble with moral statements as fact.  It sets him up for dichotomies like 
“ideas” versus “impressions” and of course “is” and “ought.” 
147 HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, supra note 136, at 31. 
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duality.  We also see dualism in Descartes, who separates mind and 
body, human and animal.   
Aristotle would, however, disagree with Descartes’ man/animal 
duality.  For Aristotle, man is an animal—a rational talking animal.  
Cartesian dualism, however, is very convenient for scientific 
experimentation (vivisection), factory farming, and other abuse:  if an 
animal has no soul and is, as Descartes argues, a mere automaton, then it 
cannot suffer.  Those are the types of errors that dualism generates:  
distinctions between “self” and “other,” which allow dehumanization 
and destruction of the other leading ultimately to a Weberian 
technocratic nightmare of bureaucratic specialization wherein each 
individual—from the worker in the munitions plant, to the pilot, to the 
bombardier—can ignore and deny that they are killing and maiming 
other humans.   
If dualism and (neo-)platonic idealism are fatally flawed, what about 
monism and materialism?  For the consistent empiricist, ideas do not 
exist apart from the people who think them.  Thus, to say that moral 
values exist or not is senseless.  What can be said is that the vast majority 
of persons in all times and places hold certain fundamental values.  It 
can also be said that ideas have certain objective consequences.  In both 
senses ideas (and moral values are one type of idea) exist, but they have 
no existence independent from the people who hold them.  Ideas are 
reflections of objects.  After all, our bodies are made of matter and our 
ideas, which are not congruent to material reality, are soon corrected, 
whether we like it or not, by materiality.  For the monist-materialist, “is” 
and “ought” are not distinct and irreconcilable.  Rather, “is” swallows 
“ought” whole:  “ought” statements are just another form of “is” 
statements.148  How these critiques of post-modern epistemological and 
moral theory influence law is the topic of the next section.   
                                                          
148  Hume’s rejection of “ought” as a special moral category is far more 
revolutionary than his rejection of the traditional concept of causal 
necessity. . . .  One can no longer chant the refrain that “ought is not 
deducible from is” because this presupposes the very thing that is to be 
proved, and it is the very thing that Hume rejects, namely the existence 
of peculiarly normative entities.  In place of a normative conception, 
Hume holds the view that ethics is an empirical science. 
Capaldi, supra note 34.  If that interpretation is correct, however, then Hume’s ethics are 
flawed by epistemological dualism. 
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IV.  LEGAL METHOD 
In Parts I through III, the ontological, epistemological, and 
axiological bases of a theory for fundamental critique of American legal-
political discourse were set out.  A monist materialist ontology sets an 
irrefutable base for the possibility of objective truth as measured by 
correspondence between descriptions of reality and observations of 
reality.149  Monism and platonic and neo-platonic noetic formalism are 
contradictory.150  Materialism leads to a rejection of platonic forms.151  
Further, Materialism leads one to reject epistemological relativism—
things do not become true simply because large numbers of people 
believe them. Rather the truth is “out there” in the real world. Truth is 
possible and is measured as a correspondence between objective reality 
in the material world and descriptions of that reality in human language.  
Human language too escapes irrelevancy because of its connection to 
empirical reality.  Thus, an objective morality is theoretically possible.  
Morality took on an objective sense when it, consequent to the 
materialist method proposed, is grounded not in erroneous formal noetic 
views, but rather as a dispassionate materialist calculus of what 
improves the life expectancy and caloric intake of humans.  With an 
objective measure of morality, we can make moral arguments that 
circumvent economism, as they look at something more fundamental 
than money:  inalienable human dignity.  Thus, the method proposed 
leads us out of the cold world of cash and into the world of 
humanitarianism.  Human dignity is not fungible.  Basic human rights 
are inalienable.  Thus, they cannot be comprehended in economic terms. 
How does this understanding of ontology (materialist and monist), 
epistemology (not nihilism or relativism, but skepticism), and axiology 
(cognitivism not relativism) influence legal methods of argumentation?  
Summarily, the realists’ rejection of formal logic was as much an error as 
their rejection of morality as a category.  By rehabilitating philosophical 
(Aristotelian and scholastic) logic on a materialist basis, in place of its 
usual noetic formalist basis, it is possible to apply objective morality to 
the law.  Thus, a unique and, in fact, new form of natural law reasoning 
is proposed.  A written law may conflict with customary moral law.  
                                                          
149 The Correspondence Theory of Truth, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence. 
150 See, e.g., Monism, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/ 
10483a.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
151 For a synoptic summary of the struggle of dualist neo-platonism against materialism 
see, Neo-Platonism, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10742b. 
htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
Engle: Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate:  Beyond Legal Realism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1670 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
However, unlike traditional views of natural law, the existence and 
resolution of conflict points between written law and unwritten law is 
determined by a materialist analysis—a contextualized examination of 
objective reality—and not by an idealistic deduction from amorphous ill 
defined pure concepts.  This argument is vectored through the failed 
conceptual challenges posed by legal realism as the logical conclusion of 
Parts I through III.  By reviewing legal realism’s failure, the necessity of a 
new way of thinking about the law becomes clear.  Both formalism and 
realism were partial and imperfect solutions to the problem of legal 
interpretation.  The theory of materialist natural law proposed is the 
dialectical synthesis resulting from the opposition of formalism versus 
realism, a relative opposition occurring within the super-structural 
justifications of a given mode of production namely, late capitalism 
(which is also called fast capitalism or casino capitalism).152 
Epistemological and axiological choices shape method.  Legal 
realism was more or less the direct outcome of these various 
epistemological and axiological currents.  Legal realism dominated 
United States legal thought from the 1930s to the 1980s, at which point it 
was first challenged.153  It has now been overtaken by economic theories 
of the law.154  However, so great was the influence of the realists—in fact 
they set the stage for law and economics155—that their methodology 
continues to heavily mark the law. 
                                                          
152 See, e.g., Robert Goldman, Stephen Papson & Noah Kersey, Speed: Through, Across, and 
in —The Landscapes of Capital, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_1/ 
gpk2.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Timothy W. Luke, Kanban Capitalism: Power, Identity, 
and Exchange in Cyberspace, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim589.htm (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2007). 
153 John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where 
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 849 n.39 (1991). 
154 Sharon K. Hom, Equality, Social and Economic Justice, and Challenges for Public Interest 
Lawyering, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 511, 516 (2005); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A 
New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 61, 88 (2005). 
155 “Thus, critical race realism encompasses not only the goals and methodologies of the 
broader critical race and feminist projects, but also some of the shared goals and 
methodologies of legal realism and law and market economy theory (which I have 
integrated into my critical race work elsewhere).”  Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: 
Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005). 
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A. Legal Realism vs. Formalism 
Epistemologically, legal realism156 opposed psychology,157 
voluntarism, and hints of class conflict against classical logic.  The 
realists quite successfully introduced a new terminology, substituting 
negative words to describe institutions they wished to replace and 
positive words to describe proposed replacements.  Thus, classical logic 
was relabeled formalism.158  Binary reasoning was relabeled, at best, 
bright-line analysis,159 at worst, talismanic160 and, in all events, as rigid161 
and inflexible.  In contrast, the realists were flexibly162 balancing163 
                                                          
156 See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
157 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 119-20 (Brentano’s 1970) (1930). 
158 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).  Holme’s 
article is oft cited and illustrates exactly the problem of modernity—the separation of law 
and morality consequent to relativism. 
159 For example, “Some commentators discussing constitutional restrictions have 
suggested reasons for successive prosecution in addition to those discussed above.  
Professor Amar, for example, advocates ‘flexible, fact- and case-specific rules of due 
process, rather than global, rigid, bright-line rules of double jeopardy.’”  Anne Bowen 
Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed, Approach, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 1183, 1284 (2004). 
160 For example, “In the final analysis, the marriage movement will not relinquish the 
talisman of marriage as fixed and natural instead of ‘ultimately dependent upon social and 
economic structures.’”  Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: 
The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 305, 366 (2006). 
161  I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as scientific because those 
who administer it believe it such.  But in truth it is not science at all.  
We no longer hold anything scientific merely because it exhibits a rigid 
scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions.  In the philosophy of 
to-day, “theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we 
can rest.” 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 957 
(1987).  In fact, instrumentalism is the essence of opportunists anywhere.  If anyone was 
unscientific, it was the realists and their progeny, the post-modernists, not the formalists.  
The old values were the wrong values; that does not mean there are no values. 
162  Nor did balancing commit the Court to an overall theory of a 
constitutional provision.  The old conceptualization could be discarded 
and a balancing approach could temporarily fill the theoretical void 
while the Court groped towards a conception more attuned to the 
times.  Of course, there was the risk that balancing’s flexibility would 
be viewed as unprincipled adjudication. 
Aleinikoff, supra note 161, at 961. 
163 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The 
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987). 
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competing interests.164  Rules were replaced with standards165 and laws 
were replaced with norms.166   
Methodologically, the legal realists advocated flexible multi-factor 
balancing tests,167 which could and did consider interests not only of the 
plaintiff and defendant, but also of society and third parties.168  They 
opposed the (supposedly) rigid, deterministic, formally valid, but 
substantively empty logic of classical legal scholarship.  Formalism, 
rigid, inflexible, and (supposedly) teleologically blind, could not defend 
itself in its own terms against the flexible, visionary, balanced realists 
because realism, unlike classical logic, pretended to understand and 
deploy psychology and to ignore the form of reasoning and look to the 
mechanics of the practical workings of power.  Thus, realism could claim 
to perceive issues that formalism (in the interest of objectivity) ignored, 
and thus be a more accurate and persuasive world view. 
The realists argued that rigid formal logic generally led to 
substantive injustice.169  In its place, they argued for flexible guidelines, 
which risk indeterminacy.170  But flexibility, while it permits the court to 
decide cases on their individual merits, can also be criticized as 
capricious,171 unprincipled, and open to abuse.  The legal methods of the 
realists, though flexible or supple, are also indeterminate.  The legal 
realists reject binary bright-line categorical analysis in favor of 
multivariate balancing tests.172  That rejection is not generally well-
founded.  Though the realists’ epistemology leads to an erroneous 
general methodological rejection of categorical analyses, the alternative 
methodology they propose is not necessarily more objective.  Indeed, 
                                                          
164 Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 40 
(1988). 
165 Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 543 (2000). 
166 Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism 
(with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 50 (2001). 
167 Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2624 (1993). 
168 “Methodologically, legal realism is a pluralistic view that marshals a multi-
disciplinary analysis of the constitutionality of speech incorporating historical, linguistic, 
social and political insights.”  Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 141, 152 (2005). 
169 For a brief overview of realism and an attempt to both criticize and ameliorate realist 
discourse, see Anthony D’Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L. J. 468 (1978). 
170 Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222 (1931). 
171 Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to “Principles and Prejudice”: Marriage and the Realization 
that Principles Win over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 325 (1996). 
172 For a discussion of balancing tests in legal theory and pedagogy, see James Boyle, The 
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. l003 (l985). 
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how could it be given the subjectivism of the realists’ epistemological 
and axiological assumptions?  Both balancing tests and bright-line 
categorical analyses are not necessarily well founded, but they can be if 
their terms are certain.  Terms are certain if they are empirically 
verifiable.  However, empirical verifiability, in a world of subjective 
moral values, leaves but one standard—cash money.  Thus, any attempt 
to use legal realism to impel necessary fundamental reform to an ossified 
constitutional structure is doomed from its inception.  For realism 
ultimately compels us, perhaps surprisingly, to the marketplace.   
Contemporary legal epistemology follows the realists’ lead and 
tends (incorrectly) to reject bright-line categorical tests and other 
methods derived from formal logic on the following grounds:   
While categorical analyses are unambiguous, they are, at 
best, teleologically blind and, at worst, teleologically 
vicious. 
(a) When teleologically vicious, formal 
manipulations are nothing more or less than the 
mask of class dominance.173 
(b) When teleologically blind, formal 
manipulations ignore whether substantive 
outcomes are just and elevate the procedural 
form over the substantive result.174 
The realists’ conclusion—laws of formal logic, such as tertium non-
datur, the law of identity “A or not A,” and categorical bright-line 
analysis—must be rejected in the name of substantive justice.  In their 
place, flexible (or manipulable) balancing tests should be adopted.175  
The rejection of formal logic is, however, ill founded.  While some 
realists pretend to be post-modernists, applying value neutral language, 
they do in fact make moral choices.  However, their moral values are not 
                                                          
173  The legal realists, Tushnet explained, demonstrated the indeterminacy 
of legal doctrine, which meant that rules and precedents could be 
manipulated to produce often contradictory legal outcomes.  The 
result was, the realists argued, that the explanation for these outcomes 
must be sought outside of the system of legal doctrine, in the sociology 
of power. 
Morton J. Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 131, 131-32 (2001). 
174 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976). 
175 See Eric Allen Engle, When is Fair Use Fair?: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Intellectual 
Property Law, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 187 (2002). 
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those of feudalism or even liberalism.  Critical scholars reject patriarchy 
and capitalism, which is a normative (i.e., moral) choice.176  This explains 
why radical critique should not be quick to reject morality or 
normativity, as radical discourse is also normative and must be if it 
wishes to effectuate change. 
Categorical analysis, a formalist method, requires an exact 
methodology (i.e., terminological and empirical certitude and strict 
application of formal logic).  Recall, however, the linguistic critiques of 
Saussure and Quine, which explain why categorical logic was rejected by 
the realists.  Since the realist revolution of the 1930s, categorical formal 
methods are criticized and generally rejected as rigid, inflexible, and 
formalism.  However, early realists’ rejection of formal logic, which they 
characterize as rationalization, is simplistic:  the realists ignore that 
formal logic and empiricism are perfectly compatible as methodological 
tools in the search for truth.  If balancing tests, favored by the teleological 
interpretation realism prescribes, can be evaluated and determined 
according to objective empirical evidence, then so too can bright-line 
categorical analyses.  There is no empirical difference between 
determining the weight to be assigned to a factor in a multi-variant 
balancing test and determining whether a bright-line threshold has been 
crossed.  The realist argument that flexible “balancing tests” are better 
than formalist, bright-line tests is thus empty.   
This Article has just shown why the realist critique is overly-
simplistic; that critique also goes too far.  The realists argue that formal 
logic is at least abused, if not misused.  Logic can, of course, be abused.  
However, the realists ignore that formal logic is only contingently, and 
not necessarily, manipulable.177  The manipulability of formal logic is 
contingent upon a combination of terminological inexactitude—which 
can exist—and intellectual dishonesty:  it is not inevitable.  If all formal 
logic were merely a manipulation designed to mask the raw exercise of 
power, then logical argument would be pointless.178  Again, that would 
force us into fascism’s volonté de puissance.  For the strong, that is not a 
problem, but supposedly radical critique claims to want to advance the 
                                                          
176 How can we distinguish norm and morés?  The norm is that which is customary, 
habitual and thus seen as normal.  These terms seem synonymous. 
177 This argument requires that one understand that contingent truth is only potentially 
true depending upon circumstances whereas necessary truths are true in all times and 
places. 
178 A post-modernist paradox: If no truth exists, how can the truth that there be no truth 
exist?  This alone should demonstrate the flaw of epistemological nihilism and/or moral 
relativism. 
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interests of the poor, the downtrodden, and the suffering.  Consequently, 
radical critique will never be arguing from a powerful position where it 
can simply force its objectives on the agenda.  Rather, all altruistic efforts 
at bettering the lot of those less fortunate must ultimately argue 
persuasively from compassion because the dispossessed lack the 
instruments of state power.   
Not only does regarding formal logic as mere manipulation—the 
mask of power—lead us to voluntarism and the fascist reductio, it also is 
self-contradictory and leads to a conclusion which, like the paradox of 
the unknowing knower, voids most nihilist discourse.  Logical 
contradictions thus undermine most relativist theses, whether such 
discourse is presented as legal realism or post-modernism.  Members of 
both schools of thought assert that there is no truth or that all truth is 
relative.  That position leads to an antinomy.  It is illogical to use logic to 
argue that one cannot use logic.  If there were no truth, or if all truth 
were relative (to what?), then statements such as “there is no truth” or 
“all truth is relative” would be logically empty of meaning.  But if such 
statements are logically empty, they cannot be the foundation of an 
argument for the result is infinite regress.  The antinomic conclusion is 
the inevitable conclusion which most post-modern and realist 
epistemology leads to and must lead to if one takes their assertions of 
truth nihilism or relativism seriously, and not as a mere sensationalist 
foil for a healthy truth skepticism which they generally are.  
Although post-modernism taken to its logical conclusion leads to an 
impermissible antinomy, a qualified realism is admissible.  The 
statement “the abuse of formal logic leads to some injustice” is perfectly 
admissible (i.e., that statement is formally valid, empirically true, and 
possibly even necessarily true).  This qualified realism is admissible and 
does not overstate the realist critique.  Truth sceptics and realists have 
some points—logic can be, and sometimes is, manipulated.  But truth 
sceptics and realists should be careful not to take their points too far lest 
nihilism annihilate their own discourse.  That annihilation—the negation 
of the negation,179 so to speak—necessarily occurs whenever realists or 
post-modernists assert a truth statement purporting to negate the 
existence of truth statements.  This annihilation happens, for example, 
when they attempt to simultaneously assert that “all moral values are 
relative” and “no truth exists.”  Those two statements are, in fact, 
logically incompatible.  They cannot be asserted simultaneously in 
                                                          
179 Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (1877), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/ 
marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch11.htm. 
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logical discourse.  They are antinomic, the former, heterologically and, 
the latter, autologically.   
This leads to the conclusion that the realists overestimated the 
difficulties of linguistic indeterminacy and formalism’s elevation of form 
over substance.  Thus, substituting interest balancing tests for bright-line 
categorical tests may not have been necessary.  Furthermore, interest 
balancing tests are generally ambiguous.  What factors are chosen?  What 
weight are the factors given?  How is that weight measured?  Thus, 
realism is an imperfect solution to an ill-defined problem, as interest 
balancing is just as manipulable as bright-line, categorical hermeneutics.   
B. Realism Set the Stage for Law and Economics 
Legal realism has given judges the necessary tools to allow the 
deployment of their subjective will—in the search for substantive 
justice—without any moral telos (final design) to guide that will.  Despite 
flaws in the relativists’ positions, their arguments have been so 
successful that contemporary values generally are only considered in 
market terms.180  Moral values are generally ignored as being subjective 
and/or indemonstrable and/or unscientific in contemporary legal 
discourse.181  As a result, economic analysis is ascendant.  This is because 
economic analysis can claim to be objective, and thus scientific.  
Economic arguments appear to be objective because they appear to be 
empirically quantifiable, therefore verifiable, and thus objective.  Of 
course, a searching critical regard shows that economic analysis carries 
                                                          
180 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).  Posner’s arguments are 
certainly coherent and internally consistent—but equating justice to the marketplace 
requires several unrealistic assumptions (rational profit maximizing economic actors, 
fungible goods, no transaction costs) and is in the end likely wrong.  There are values 
which are non-fungible: they’re called human rights.  But see United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand’s test). 
181 See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies In Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 81, 94 (1991).  Purvis argues, incorrectly, that liberalism postulates that value is 
subjective. 
The second premise of liberalism is the principle of subjective value.  
This radical epistemology emphasises that moral truth and moral 
worth are subjective, because as an epistemological matter universal 
morality is unknowable.  There is no accessible “objective value,” 
“intelligible essence,” “virtue,” or Platonic form.  There can be “no 
natural distinctions among things, nor any hierarchy of essences that 
might serve as the basis for drawing up general categories of facts and 
classifying particulars under those categories.” 
Id.  But Purvis confuses epistemological dualism with axiological cognitivism.  It is 
perfectly possible to be both an ontological or epistemological materialist and a moral 
cognitivist. 
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its own biases and that some objects do allow economic analysis—
markets with very few or even no actors, for an easy example.  
Externalities182 and the question of fungibility also explain why 
skepticism towards the universality of market values is justified.  
Economic agents are not always rational profit maximizers.183  Goods are 
not always fungible or alienable, nor should they always be. 
The teleological critique of formalism presented by realism depends 
upon an objectivist axiology, which realism helped to destroy.184  
Realism’s inability to elaborate a viable axiology is one more reason why 
the realist critique of legal methodology, which is ultimately a critique of 
formalism’s supposedly absent teleology, failed.   
If all moral values are merely subjective, then only economic values 
are scientifically objective (i.e. quantifiable and verifiable).  Thus, the 
judicial willpower realism unleashed is now exercised to serve the 
interests of the wealthy because only economic values can claim to be 
objective in a world that holds moral values are intersubjective.  Moral 
values have been eclipsed by economic values because contemporary 
epistemology is generally skeptical toward the existence of truth and 
rejects the existence, or at least the cognizability, of objective moral 
values.  If “no truth exists” or “all values are relative”—statements that 
were shown to be illogical but were nonetheless in vogue because they 
are shocking (thus getting media attention), and their less extreme 
versions, are well-founded—then economic empiricism is the only 
remaining scientific argument.  Taking the gambit of moral relativism in 
an attempt to change failed values is a dead end.  It prevents elucidating 
any new values to replace the failed old ones.  This vacuum is then filled 
by “objective” economic values, which merely ensure the continuation 
and even exacerbation of income inequality, patriarchy, and social 
injustice.   
                                                          
182 Efficient markets “require that participants have perfect information, incur no 
transaction costs, and that there are no externalities not reflected in the market 
information . . . .”  Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and 
Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 169 n.295 (1988). 
183 “[F]ew (if any) sellers are always rational profit-maximizers.”  Tasty Baking Co. v. 
Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see also USX Corp. v. United 
States, 12 C.I.T. 205, 210 (1988). 
184 These facts help to explain some of the paralysis and cacophony in contemporary 
legal theory, especially in contemporary American legal theory. 
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C. Critique of Realist Legal Method 
Rather than arguing within the presumption that economic value is 
the only value, or the only objective value, methodological critiques of 
economic analyses are more effective when they question the 
epistemology upon which balancing tests are founded.  An 
epistemological critique of the realists and post-modernists is possible 
because truth negationist epistemology is incorrect.  True statements do 
in fact exist.  It is true that not all arguments are verifiable and that not 
all arguments are falsifiable.  It is also true, however, that some 
arguments may be verified, or at least falsified, and that not all 
arguments that are falsifiable necessarily imply a verifiable contrary 
position.  Thus, the critiques of formalism may not be as strong as 
commonly believed.  Further, we can use formal logic to question the 
validity of balancing tests.  Are balancing tests objective or predictable?  
If they are not, are they manipulable?  What does that imply for the rule 
of law?   
Limiting the inquiry here to the mechanics of legal balancing tests, 
the first question is whether the balancing tests proposed by realists are, 
or can be, on solid empirical foundations.  When balancing tests are 
applied by relativists, they lose their material foundation.  Even with a 
proper material foundation, however, balancing tests are still 
questionable.  Are balancing tests truly objective?  Do they lead to 
foreseeable, predictable outcomes?  The manipulability even of 
empirically justified balancing tests arises in the answers to two 
questions:  (1) Which factors are chosen to be balanced?  (Note that a 
pure economic analysis will exclude certain factors and privilege others); 
and (2) What weight are the chosen factors given?185  The strength of 
economic analysis is its ability to provide an objective standard by which 
to weigh various factors in balancing tests—if we assume that markets 
exist and clear, goods are fungible, and there are no significant 
externalities, all of which are large assumptions.  However, sometimes 
some or all of those assumptions are true.  But more often than not, one 
or more of those criteria will be lacking in any market analysis.   
The answers to the questions “which factors” and “what weight” are 
ultimately determined not by democratic process (which at least would 
support intersubjectivism), but rather by judicial decision.  One of the 
principled reasons for judicial reluctance to intervene in political issues 
                                                          
185 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1254 (1999). 
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prior to 1937 was that judicial decisions are un-democratic.  Court 
judgments were seen as legitimate prior to the realists because they were 
the product of logic.  But if logic and judicial decision-making are 
unconnected or unconnectable, then judicial decision-making is just an 
undemocratic exercise of raw power.  If judicial willpower (as opposed 
to objective reasoning) determines “which factors” and “what weight,” 
then we are brought out of the pseudo-objective world of 
intersubjectivism into exactly the legal world the realists predicted and 
criticized—one in which reason is rationalization.  Realism thus scores at 
least two own-goals:  first, it opens the door to law and economics, and, 
second, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy and reduces legal decision to mere 
rationalization.  However, while legal realism’s prophecies may appear 
self-fulfilling, they are not.  A monist materialism approach would lead 
to objectively verifiable and foreseeable outcomes.   
Another methodological critique of realism and its progeny looks 
within realism to compare “vague,” “manipulable,” and “teleologically 
blind” outcomes, generated by supposedly flawed formalism and 
categorical analysis that (supposedly) ignore substantive justice, with the 
outcomes generated by balancing tests.186  In fact, we can see that 
balancing tests are no less vague and, in fact, more manipulable than so-
called “bright-line tests” and “talismans.”  Balancing tests imply 
multiple poles of interest and more terms of analysis, and thus provide 
greater room for the exercise of de facto legislative power—by judges.  
Realism represents no progress toward objectivity.   
Despite these facts:   
(1) The realists’ epistemology can be defended, though 
only in a qualified manner.  Truth negationism is 
inadmissible, but truth skepticism is permissible.  
(2) The realists’ preferred methodology, balancing tests, 
can be just as objective as categorical bright-line analyses 
if, and only if, factors are specified and objectively 
weighed. 
                                                          
186 See, e.g., Balancing Tests, Legal Theory Lexicon, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_ 
theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Iddo Porat, The 
Transformation of American Constitutional Balancing: The History of Constitutional Balancing 
from Holmes to the Present Day (2005), (unpublished article), available at http://law.bepress. 
com/expresso/eps/733/. 
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(3) The realists’ methodology is no more capricious than 
categorical analyses because it is empirically grounded 
upon data which are often, though not necessarily, 
quantifiable and verifiable.   
This explains why so much super-structural foment has had so little 
actual affect on relations of production within the United States.  In the 
1930s, America faced an economic crisis that, with the exception of 
hyperinflation, was just as serious as that facing Germany at that time.187  
The democratic response to the economic crisis was less effective than 
the fascist response.  The war fought and won, trends already begun in 
1917—the feminization of the workplace188 and the civil rights 
movement—intensified.  Yet, these massive social movements had only 
little influence on the law.  Likewise, the counterculture protests of the 
1960s were also a radical change in sexual and race relations—with few 
formal legal impacts, especially when viewed in the long term.189  “Black 
is beautiful,” “affirmative action,” and “women’s liberation” have all 
been contained and defanged as bases for radical critique of the 
American empire, which is bad for Americans because the only critique 
possible is the critique of the gun carried out by the Intifadah, by Hamas, 
the insurgents, and those labeled terrorists.  Is a boy throwing stones at a 
tank in his neighborhood a terrorist?  What about the jet jock 10,000 feet 
up raining death down on him and his relatives?  Today we see the same 
types of radical protest gathering that rocked the world in the 1960s.  If 
                                                          
187  From 1930 to 1940, federal spending tripled in volume as new 
programs were created and old ones expanded in a costly effort to 
revive the collapsing economy.  As a share of the gross domestic 
product (GDP), federal spending rose from 3.4 percent in 1930 to 9.8 
percent in 1940.  Yet, despite this unprecedented surge in spending, 
America’s GDP fell by 27 percent part way through the decade and by 
1938 was less than two percent above its 1929 level.  For American 
workers, the failure of this spending spree to do anything more than 
expand the deficit and bureaucracy was devastating.  The number of 
unemployed more than doubled from 2.8 million at the beginning of 
the decade to 6.9 million in 1940. 
Dr. Ronald D. Utt, Lessons on How NOT to Stimulate the Economy (2001), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/BG1495.cfm. 
188 George Mason University, “Continued Employment after the War?”: The Women’s Bureau 
Studies Postwar Plans of Women Workers,  http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/7027/ (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
189 E.g., Daniel Gutman & Tyler Lewis, In the Wake of Proposal 2’s Passage, Affirmative 
Action Supporters Look to the Future (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.civilrights.org/ 
issues/affirmative/remote-page.jsp?itemID=29141557.  “With the passage of Proposal 2, 
Michigan becomes the third state after California and Washington to ban via ballot 
initiative affirmative action and equal opportunity initiatives in state contracting, 
education, and employment.”  Id. 
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they are to have any impact on the legal system, then they require a 
correct theoretical base on which to found arguments and make 
demands of the system that profits from oil wars. 
Under the right circumstances, these subsurface waves of conflict 
break out into tempests in the “real world” of praxis.  The war in Iraq and 
the abject failure of the United States government to do anything but 
squander resources may provide those circumstances.  Conditions are 
aligning, which are going to force people into asking radical questions.  
Why is the United States fighting wars for oil?  Why does it not consider 
alternatives, such as ethanol, bicycles, and trains?  The real question of 
9/11 is not who knocked down the towers, but rather why the towers 
were knocked down.  The real question in Iraq is not how to win an 
unwinnable war.  The real question is why is the United States fighting a 
war in a country that not only did not regard bin Laden as an ally, but 
also saw him as an enemy and did not fund him?  An even tougher 
question that deserves to be asked is why the C.I.A. funded bin Laden in 
the first place?  These facts show that the United States military 
industrial complex is beyond civilian control and must be reined in, 
which requires fundamental reordering of American intellectual 
discourse around the idea of natural law.  This Article has attempted to 
show just how that can be done. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 
This Article explains some of the foundations of contemporary legal 
method and shows how post-modernism tends to take these theories too 
far.  It also shows that contemporary understandings of Hume go too far 
in attributing positions to him that he did not enunciate.  Hume never 
refutes the existence or possible existence of morality, either as a concept 
or an object of cognition.  Rather, Hume “merely” seeks to place the 
burden on whoever seeks to express moral choice to show the connection 
between normative and positive statements.  However, that is a trap 
because the transition cannot be proven in Hume’s dualistic universe.  
Hume’s trap, while devastatingly subtle, is founded on a false dualistic 
postulate, which he presents as self-evident, that there be a fundamental 
difference between statements of fact and statements about fact (i.e., 
between “is” and “ought”).  Hume is one more example of dualism 
creating false dichotomies, “man/woman,” “master/slave,” 
“man/animal,” “self/other,” etc.  Hume’s dualist ontology and 
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epistemology190 (“is”/”ought”) parallels Descartes’ ontological dualism 
(god:man::man:animal) and Plato’s epistemological dualism 
(form>matter).   
The bitter irony is that the very people who claim to recognize and 
wish to end the problem of suffering arising out of dualism are doing 
exactly what they should not.  Post-modernism and legal realism, 
instead of concentrating on the dualism that is the source of the problem 
of alienation and oppression, contents itself with ineffective and self-
defeating gambits that backfire by unknowingly replacing moral values 
with economical ones.   
The cognition of moral values as statements of social fact (i.e., that X 
persons in Y region believe in the truth of statement Z) is a better 
explanation of how statements such as “there is insufficient food in 
Ireland” and “thus we must donate food” can escape from enthymeme 
and become well formed practical syllogisms.  Hume does not overtly 
reject Aristotle’s practical reasoning (phroenesis) and the practical 
syllogism that embodies it.  Instead, Hume sets a trap for the unwary:  he 
places the burden of proof that a normative or practical syllogism is well-
formed squarely on the shoulders of he who presents it—where it 
belongs—and leaves open the relativist possibility as a gambit.  Post-
modernism took that gambit and falls into his trap.  This explains why 
the heir to legal realism, Critical Legal Studies, is going nowhere.191 
The implication of these theoretical positions for legal methodology 
is that legal methods predicated upon overly-broad interpretations of 
Nietzsche and Hume, such as legal realism and post-modernism, must 
be reconsidered.  The post-war rise of legal balancing and the pejorative 
characterization of objective logic as “formalism” are errors in legal 
methodology, which rob law of objectivity and open it to accusations of 
perpetrating systemic injustice.  Such accusations are often well-
founded.  But to identify a problem correctly (unfair laws) does not 
necessarily mean that one has also identified the correct solution 
(rejection of formal logic).  Such was the case of the legal realists and the 
                                                          
190 “According to Hume, all mental activities are perceptions.  Perceptions are of two 
kinds, impressions and ideas. . . .  Reason is of two kinds: comparing ideas (relations of 
ideas) and inferring matters of fact . . . .”  Capaldi, supra note 34, at 126.  It is exactly this 
dualism which the author regards as the source of conflict in Western theory and praxis. 
191 Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) failed due to a lack of radical commitment.  CLS theory 
was closet Marxism and so went nowhere because it did not commit to Marx and was 
decimated by the same relativism that undercut realism.  See, e.g., E. Dana Neacsu, CLS 
Stands for Critical Legal Studies, if Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 415 (2000). 
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post-modernists.  Without the correct tools to combat injustice, no 
progress would be possible. 
To develop correct legal methods tools we must first understand and 
reject dualism and philosophical idealism (platonic formalism and its 
eidos).  Platonism is the usual root of natural law thinking, but not a 
necessary one.  We must develop an objective axiology based on a 
monist-materialist foundation.  With correct epistemology and axiology, 
we can then examine legal methodology as it manifests in cases and 
constellations of cases to determine the best methods to attain both 
transactional (arithmetic) and social (geometric) justice.  Undoubtedly, 
new legal methods will arise and old ones are reformed or rejected.  
Consequently, theory will be put into practice in the interests of justice.  
That is a much greater task than could be outlined in this Article, but it is 
a first step to attaining that goal. 
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